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Concerns and Ideas About the Developing English Law 
of Privacy (And How Knowledge of Foreign Law 
Might Be of Help) 
1. INTRODUCTORY EMARKS 
Few can doubt that the UK Human Rights Act 1998, in incorpo- 
rating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and in 
particular the guarantee of the right to privacy in Article 8 of the 
Convention into UK domestic law, and also in requiring the judiciary 
in s. 6 to have regard to the Convention in developing the common 
law, is having a considerable effect on the developing protection of 
human privacy in English common law. This was predicted when the 
Human Rights Bill was going through its various parliamentary 
phases by many, including the Lord Chancellor, who described the 
judges "as pen-poised . . . to develop a right of privacy."' Also pre- 
dicted was the way the expansion was likely to come about: incre- 
mentally and, initially at least, by means of expanding established 
torts.2 The early judicial decisions that have been handed down since 
the coming into force in October 2000 of the 1998 Act confirm the 
above predictions. Arguably, they also display the defects of dealing 
with new societal problems by putting old torts on the Procrustean 
bed and stretching them out of shape to meet new requirements. 
Those who share this view may ask why the richer experience of 
other systems, in particular that of Germany, France and the USA, 
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Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era, 63 MOD. L. REV. 660 (2000). 
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has not been extensively employed to help English judges at this 
formative stage of a new era. In fact, foreign experience has, if any- 
thing, been (mis)used, mainly by those who oppose the creation of a 
new tort of privacy or some equivalent thereof, to stunt such a devel- 
opment. The motives for such actions may be understandable. But 
the way foreign law and comparative legal experience has been mis- 
represented or overlooked to restrict developments in our law cannot 
be left un-answered. 
The purpose of this article is also to point out some of the incre- 
mental changes that have taken place in English privacy law, not- 
withstanding opposition by some parts of the UK Press and the self- 
regulatory press body, the Press Complaints Commission, politicians' 
fears to act (lest they incur the wrath of the newspaper magnates), 
and judicial timidity expressed in the form of opting for the path of 
least resistance. The authors of this article feel that this timid way of 
proceeding poses problems; and in this paper they will explore some 
of them and outline the parameters of a more coherent approach, 
whilst also welcoming the changes that have come about in a remark- 
ably short period of time. In doing this, they will invoke where neces- 
sary the lessons of foreign experience; but as one of them has 
repeatedly stressed,3 this reference to foreign law will not present it 
solely in terms of its own - often theoretical - self-description, but 
will try to present it in a way that makes it suitable for importation 
into English law. This paper is thus as much an exercise in compara- 
tive methodology as it is an attempt to depict our developing law of 
privacy, warts and all. 
2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF PRIVACY 
It is understandable that the judiciary has used recent case law 
as an occasion to re-state the well-known view that English law (or 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights) does 
not require the development of an independent tort of privacy. Dis- 
putes about whether a law of privacy is required and its potential 
implications for the Press have consistently raged over the English 
legal landscape for the better part of thirty-five years. Due caution 
would suggest that the judiciary would do well to avoid being em- 
broiled in this debate, and cautious pragmatism has been the keynote 
of the case-law so far. 
In the absence of a tort of privacy, the equitable remedy of confi- 
dence,4 a variety of torts linked to intentional infliction of harm to the 
person,5 and administrative law principles relating to the appropri- 
3. Basil Markesinis, most recently in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE COURTROOM AND 
THE CLASSROOM: THE STORY OF THE LAST THIRTY FIVE YEARS (Oxford: Hart, 2003). 
4. See, e.g., A v. B plc [2003] Q.B. 195. 
5. Home Office v. Wainwright [2001] EWCA Civ. 2081. 
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ate use of police powers,6 have all been recently called into service to 
resolve cases which, at their root, involve allegations of an infringe- 
ment of personal privacy. However, the application of this multiplic- 
ity of different remedies has been accompanied by frequent and 
emphatic judicial assertions that no general tort of privacy exists in 
English law, with the House of Lords confirming this view in Wain- 
wright v Home Office.7 
Of course, bold judges (of the kind which our society welcomes 
less readily than it did, say, one hundred or even fifty years ago) 
would be prepared to cut through the dense thicket created by their 
brothers' complexity and caution, and admit that what was really at 
stake in these cases, despite the convoluted legal routes adopted, 
was, in essence, the protection of the human personality, and the pri- 
vate space necessary for it to grow and develop in all its manifesta- 
tions. Thus, it comes really as no surprise that Lord Cottenham LC 
acknowledged in Prince Albert v. Stranges that privacy was the inter- 
est which had really been affected in that case. This same approach 
was espoused many years later by Lord Denning when speaking in 
the House of Lords in support of Lord Mancroft's Privacy Bill.9 Both 
were bold judges, and both were willing and able to cut to the core of 
what was at stake when privacy was endangered. 
But the mentality of the modern judges does not allow such 
flights of the imagination. Thus, in his decision in the case of R v 
Wainwright when it was before the Court of Appeal'o, Lord Justice 
Mummery asserted that: 
"As to the future I foresee serious definitional difficulties and 
conceptual problems in the judicial development of a "blockbuster" 
tort vaguely embracing such a potentially wide range of situations. I 
am not even sure that anybody - the public, Parliament, the Press - 
really wants the creation of a new tort, which could give rise to as 
many problems as it is sought to solve. A more promising and well 
trodden path is that of incremental evolution, both at common law 
and by statute. . .of traditional nominate torts pragmatically crafted 
as to conditions of liability, specific defences and appropriate reme- 
dies, and tailored to suit significantly different privacy interests and 
infringement situations." 
Leaving aside Lord Justice Mummery's assertion that nobody 
"wants" such a development - and one could argue that the public 
certainly does,11 Parliament probably does (but does not dare to 
6. Ellis v. Chief Constable Essex Police [2003] EWHC 1321. 
7. [2003] UKHL 53, 16 October 2003. 
8. (1849) 1 Mac. & G.25, 47. 
9. HL Debates, Vol. 229, col. 638. 
10. [2001] EWCA Civ. 2081, at para. 42. 
11. On this, at least, there seems to be reliable empirical evidence to suggest that 
the learned Lord Justice's view does not correspond to reality. See The Public Inter- 
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act)12, and the Press is divided - one must really ask whether the 
"pragmatic" way favoured by the learned judge really has the advan- 
tages he claims it does. Similarly, one must question Lord Hoff- 
mann's assertion in the same case that privacy, freedom of speech 
and other underlying values of the common law are not "capable of 
sufficient definition to enable one to deduce specific rules to be ap- 
plied in concrete contexts. . .that is not the way the common law 
works"'13, and that any "perceived gap can be filled by judicious devel- 
opment of an existing principle" without having to acknowledge the 
existence of a general tort of privacy.14 This expectation that a cau- 
tious, pragmatic approach is preferable to one based on the applica- 
tion of a general principle of privacy is very questionable. 
The Wainwright case concerned an attempt by counsel for the 
plaintiffs to obtain a remedy for the intrusive strip-search to which 
the Wainwrights had been subject by arguing that various torts of 
intentional interference with the body of a person should be given an 
expanded definition to protect personal privacy, or in the alternative, 
that an autonomous tort of privacy should finally be recognised in 
English law. In the initial county court decision, Judge McGonigal 
had concluded that the conduct of the prison staff in conducting the 
searches did constitute a tort of trespass to the person. This finding 
was based inter alia upon both an extended application of the rule in 
Wilkinson v. Downton15 that the intentional infliction of emotional 
harm constituted a form of trespass, and an additional finding by the 
judge that, in the wake of the Human Rights Act, an unjustified inva- 
sion of privacy could in itself constitute trespass to the person, tres- 
pass being capable of extending to other interests other than 
protection from bodily harm. 
The Court of Appeal was quick to reject both grounds, with Lord 
Justice Buxton commenting as follows on this extravagant stretching 
of trespass under the telling heading: "The inappropriateness of 
trespass":16 
est, the Media and Privacy, survey commissioned by the BBC, the Broadcasting Stan- 
dards Commission, the Independent Committee for the Supervision of Standards of 
Telephone Information Services, the Independent Television Commission, the Insti- 
tute for Public Policy Research, and the Radio Authority, conducted under the super- 
vision of Professor David Morrison and Michael Svennevig, published in 2002 and 
available on the websites of the commissioning bodies. 
12. See the Fifth Report from the Culture, Sport and Media Committee, Privacy 
and Media Intrusion, Session 2002-3, HC 458, Vols. I-III: "III. On balance, we firmly 
recommend that the Government reconsider their position and bring forward legisla- 
tive proposals to clarify the protection that individuals can expect from unwarranted 
intrusion by anyone - not the press alone - into their private lives". 
13. Op cit., para. 31. 
14. Op cit., para. 18. 
15. [1897] 2 Q.B. 57. 
16. Sub-title to para. 48, emphasis added. 
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"Whatever torts the Wainwrights may be able to complain of, 
none of them are, or can properly be seen, as derivatives of the tort of 
trespass to the person, and only confusion was caused by the attempt 
to force what occurred in this case into that straitjacket. That objec- 
tion is not merely an obsolete recourse to the forms of action, nor a 
reflection of a mediaeval distinction between trespass and case. As I 
shall demonstrate, it reflects fundamental principles by which mod- 
ern English law, rightly or wrongly, limits the ambit of tortious 
liability." 
Lord Justice Mummery agreed with this criticism, and the House 
of Lords in its decision in the same case came to a similar conclusion 
in respect of the same arguments. Yet the alternative pragmatic ap- 
proach that both courts advocate in the same case towards ensuring 
the protection of privacy is based upon a similar artificial and confus- 
ing stretching of existing tortious remedies. In Wainwright, the Law 
Lords refused to recognise the existence of a separate and free-stand- 
ing tort of privacy, relying upon the progressive extension of the ex- 
isting breach of confidence action to protect privacy interests. Yet this 
involves an identical process of distorting existing torts as that 
criticised by Lord Justice Buxton. 
Nor, unfortunately, is the Wainwright decision a novel one in 
this respect. The objections of Lord Justice Buxton can also be ap- 
plied to the following attempts, listed below, to stretch existing torts 
to fit privacy within their scope (all of which are well-known to En- 
glish lawyers, who have had to grapple with the conceptual lack of 
clarity in this area for decades now). What these cases (some success- 
ful, some not) have in common is that they all raise serious doubts 
about the efficacy of what one could, at present, call the Wainwright 
pragmatic approach to protecting privacy via the incremental exten- 
sion of existing remedies to suit the circumstances as required. All 
have involved a judicial choice between two options. The first option 
was to accept that existing remedies, in the absence of a tort of pri- 
vacy, were inadequate to protect against even massively exploitative 
intrusions upon personal privacy. Alternatively, the second option 
was to fashion a new remedy by the stretching of an existing rule to 
provide a degree of partial, confusing, and doctrinally unsound pro- 
tection. This false choice has repeatedly constrained the approach of 
the English courts. As we will argue, the development of the law of 
confidence since Douglas and Zeta-Jones is only the latest artificial 
and unsatisfactory attempt to stretch the fabric of an existing tort to 
fit privacy within its straitjacket.'7 
17. See also A. Morgan, Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: "Hello" 
Trouble, 62 (2) CAMBRIDGE L. J. 444 (2003). 
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(a) Gordon Kaye v. Andrew Robertson and Sport Newspapers 
Ltd. is 
The facts of this decision are well-known and strikingly odious. 
The plaintiff, a well-known actor, attempted to obtain an order re- 
straining the publication of photographs of the injuries he had sus- 
tained in a car crash which had been obtained via deception by a 
tabloid's journalists while he was still in hospital undergoing treat- 
ment. Counsel for the plaintiff in seeking relief argued for the appli- 
cability of a multitude of different torts, including libel, trespass and 
nuisance.'9 The Court of Appeal concluded that only malicious false- 
hood was applicable to the circumstances of the case, having decided 
that no tort of privacy existed in English law, and granted the plain- 
tiff a limited and inadequate remedy, merely prohibiting the publica- 
tion of any inference that Mr. Kaye had given informed consent to the 
publication of the story. 
We have come across no judicial or academic dicta to suggest 
other than full condemnation of the unsatisfactory nature of the re- 
sult (reluctantly) reached by a strong Court of Appeal. A better exam- 
ple of the limitations of the 'pragmatic' approach through existing 
torts cannot be had. Recognised torts gave inadequate protection to 
the plaintiff despite attempts to stretch them to cover the appalling 
intrusion in question, while the Court of Appeal choose to apply this 
inadequate level of protection rather than take the bold step of 
recognising a tort of privacy. This unfortunate decision has subse- 
quently been treated as authority for the proposition that English 
common law does not encompass a privacy tort, and its influence has 
acted as a dead hand on any potential for developing remedies 
against privacy intrusions. The result was not made any better when, 
many years later, the European Commission on Human Rights was 
persuaded not to protect a similarly placed English claimant on the 
very unconvincing ground that recent developments in the law of 
breach of confidence afforded adequate remedies unavailable at the 
time of Kaye.20 Recent developments notwithstanding, Kaye remains 
a compelling demonstration of the limits of both existing English law 
and of the limitations of an approach that relies upon inadequate ex- 
isting remedies to protect privacy. 
18. [1991] FSR 62. 
19. Significantly, breach of confidence was not pleaded in the Kaye case, presuma- 
bly because Mr. Kaye's legal advisers considered that it could not offer an appropriate 
remedy for their client. Lord Bingham, who was one of the judges who heard the case, 
has subsequently argued (extra-judicially) that it would not have succeeded. Thus, see 
his Opinion: Should there be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal Privacy, in THE BUSI- 
NESS OF JUDGING (OUP 2000), pp. 148-49. Lord Scott, on the other hand, has taken a 
different view; see "Confidentiality", in Jack Beatson and Yvonne Cripps (eds.) THE 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 272. 
20. Spencer v. United Kingdom [1998] 25 EHHR CD 105. 
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(b) Bernstein of Leigh v. Skyviews & General Ltd.21 
This decision, which saw a plaintiff denied a remedy in trespass 
for aerial over-flights and photography of his country estate, is an- 
other example of a tortured attempt to provide a remedy through 
trespass to land or nuisance for what was a clear case of snooping and 
unacceptable aerial surveillance.22 The case, once again, shows the 
limitations of the pragmatic approach. The reader should place him- 
self in the hypothetical position of being the owner of similar prem- 
ises to those with which this case was concerned. Most persons in 
such position would believe that they were going about their lawful 
business free from external snooping. But the attempt in the Bern- 
stein case to use trespass to ensure a remedy for this intrusion merely 
succeeded in establishing that trespass would fail if the picture was 
taken from an angle outside the property, even if it was taken from a 
low height that, potentially, brought the intruder within the air space 
of the observed person. Nuisance would in all likelihood likewise fail, 
and following the decision of the Law Lords in the Hunter v. Canary 
Wharf Ltd. case23 would certainly not provide any protection to any 
guests or visiting friends of the property owner, if he/she has no inter- 
est in the surveyed land. And if the surveillance or photographing 
was the result of an isolated event, it would not be covered by nui- 
sance at all (though now it may possibly be covered by the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997). Do such scholastic niceties in the face of 
considerable intrusion into personal privacy do credit to the law? 
(c) Khorasandjian v. Bush24 
In this case, the Court of Appeal granted an injunction to re- 
strain the defendant harassing the plaintiff by repeated telephone 
calls. Again, it involved another attempt to provide a legal remedy for 
what should be an impermissible activity by stretching the law of 
nuisance, which was upheld this time, despite the doctrinally unsat- 
isfactory nature of this artificial extension. A valiant dissent by Lord 
Justice Gibson rejecting the artificiality of this extension thus had to 
await later vindication by the House of Lords in Hunter v. Canary 
Wharf Ltd.,25 which disapproved of the Court of Appeal's attempted 
expansion of the tort, even if this later decision itself raises many 
uncertainties (and which left many potential claimants unsatisfied 
21. [1978] QB 479. 
22. Cf. and contrast OLG K61n 13 October 1988, NJW 1989, 720 - the case of land 
owner observing through video camera fixed in a bird house situated on his land the 
comings and goings of his neighbour. The latter's claim for 7,000DM was strength- 
ened by the fact that the "observer" had been earlier ordered by (another) court to 
desist but had refused to do so. 
23. [1997] AC 655. 
24. [1993] QB 727. 
25. [1997] 2 WLR 684. 
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because of the quaint requirements of a tort - nuisance - originally 
devised seven hundred years ago to deal with noxious smells). 
(d) Tolley v. Fry26 
Tolley remains the archetypal illustration of judicial ingenuity in 
the face of a lacuna in English law: the misuse of the image of the 
plaintiff, an amateur golfer, was held in the particular circumstances 
of the case to constitute defamation, as the use of his image was 
deemed to imply that he was a professional. This solution worked 
here because of the quaint mores of the times. But in contemporary 
circumstances, it manifestly fails to provide protection to those who 
might need it most. Its limitations were graphically illustrated in 
Kaye, where the Court of Appeal refused to apply the Tolley prece- 
dent to give redress; and in all likelihood no remedy in defamation 
would exist today for a similar appropriation of an individual's per- 
sonal image. (Whether the law of confidence would now provide such 
a remedy remains very uncertain, as discussed below.) 
(e) Re X27 
This decision first provided anonymity to the daughter of Mary 
Bell, who had while still a young girl murdered another child and had 
therefore acquired tabloid notoriety. Here, the English courts again 
artificially stretched their existing powers by invoking the old judi- 
cial wardship jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining the pub- 
lication of information as to the identity and whereabouts of her 
young daughter (and by extension, her mother) to protect against 
press intrusion. Academics pointed out at the time the limitations of 
the wardship jurisdiction and the consequent age limit to the extent 
of the protection offered to Mary Bell's privacy and that of her child. 
However, the point became manifest to all most recently as the 
daughter neared the age of majority and thus the end of the wardship 
period, and has therefore necessitated further judicial ingenuity, 
time, and expense to sort the problem out in the way that had been 
already clearly indicated and worked out by the German Constitu- 
tional Court precisely thirty years ago by means of their coherent ap- 
proach to privacy.28 In her recent admirably clear and concise 
judgement, Butler-Sloss LJ arrived at the same position as the Con- 
stitutional Court by adopting a similar approach based on principle 
and due recognition of the crucial importance of privacy within the 
ECHR framework of rights (albeit via the loose framework of breach 
26. [1931] AC 333. 
27. [1984] 1 WLR 1422. 
28. BVerfGE 35, 202, translated in BASIL MARKESINIS and HANNES UNBERATH, 
THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE, 4th ed. (Oxford: Hart, 2002), 
423 ff. 
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of confidence, which will be discussed further on).29 Prior to this, in 
contrast, pragmatic judicial ingenuity within existing frameworks 
had proved to be inadequate, riddled with difficulties and in need of 
precisely such a principled approach. 
(f) Douglas v. Hello30 
These two recent decisions which came in the wake of the coming 
into force of the Human Rights Act saw Michael Douglas, Catherine 
Zeta-Jones and OK! Magazine obtain damages against Hello! Maga- 
zine for publishing unauthorised photographs of their wedding when 
the rights to publish images of the wedding had been previously sold 
to OK! These decisions will be discussed further on in the context of 
the expanding protection afforded by the equitable remedy of breach 
of confidence. However, it is worth noting that the key issue at stake 
in both decisions was arguably not confidence or privacy but in real- 
ity the right of publicity. This is not merely a terminological observa- 
tion but a point which can have important legal consequences which 
we shall highlight when we discuss compensation (which we do, 
briefly, below). It also illustrates the range of problems that the ac- 
tion for breach of confidence is now being stretched to encompass, 
both in the Douglas cases and in the subsequent celebrity confidence 
cases. 
The expansion of the law of confidence in the wake of the Human 
Rights Act, begun in Douglas (No. 1) decision, is the latest and most 
far-reaching example of Procrustean stretch in the realm of privacy. 
S. 6 of the Act requires the courts to give effect to the rights contained 
in the Convention in developing the common law, which include the 
Article 8 right to privacy. The courts have attempted to do this, using 
the cautious, pragmatic and incremental approach favoured by Mum- 
mery LJ and the Law Lords in Wainwright. Private material can now 
increasingly be classed as "confidential" and therefore injunctive re- 
lief or damages can be obtained to deter publication of such material 
as this now would constitutes a "breach of confidence". The develop- 
ment of the confidence action in this way, unlike the previous at- 
tempts to artificially stretch causes of action discussed above, is often 
presented as adequately and coherently covering the vast majority of 
instances of intrusions upon privacy. Lord Woolf C.J. explicitly states 
this in A v. B plc:31 
"It is most unlikely that any purpose will be served by a judge 
seeking to decide whether there exists a new cause of action in tort 
29. X (A woman formerly known as Mary Bell) v O'Brien and others [2003] EWHC 
1101. 
30. [2001] 2 WLR 992 (CA), henceforth referred to as Douglas No 1, and Douglas 
v. Hello! Ltd. [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), henceforth referred to as Douglas No 2. 
31. [2003] Q.B. 195, 205. 
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which protects privacy. In the great majority of situations, if not all 
situations, where the protection of privacy is justified, relating to 
events after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, an action for breach of confidence now will, where this is appropriate, provide the 
necessary protection." 
It remains to be seen whether Lord Woolfbs confidence is justi- fied. Much depends on whether the framework of the action is flexible 
enough to be stretched in incremental stages sufficiently far to en- 
compass the diversity of privacy claims, and to give appropriate rem- 
edies where necessary, while retaining coherence. Lindsay J. in 
Douglas No. 2 was considerably less sanguine: 
"Further development by the Courts may merely be awaiting the first post-Human Rights Act case where neither the law of confidence 
nor any other domestic law protects an individual who deserves pro- 
tection. A glance at a crystal ball of, so to speak, only a low wattage 
suggests that if Parliament does not act soon the less satisfactory 
course, of the Courts creating the law bit by bit at the expense of litigants and with inevitable delays and uncertainty, will be thrust 
upon the judiciary."32 
There are strong indications that the pragmatic extension of the law of confidence will be inadequate to protect privacy as a result of 
the inherent limitations of the action. Despite Lord Woolfbs optimism in A v. B plc, the development of confidence bears all the signs of being another artificial stretching of a cause of action to give limited 
and patchy relief to certain types of privacy violations.33 Contrary to 
some of the extravagant claims made on its behalf, the expansion and distortion of the confidence action cannot serve as an adequate sub- 
stitute for a full privacy action, unless by either judicial sleight of hand or the bold grasping of the privacy nettle, a free-standing right 
to privacy emerges fully-formed like Athena from the limitations of 
the confidence action.34 
3. THE EXPANSION F CONFIDENTIALITY 
Notwithstanding the concerns or objections voiced above, the progression of confidentiality is a (partially) welcome development for 
those of us who support the expanded protection of human privacy. 
32. Op cit., note 35, § 51 (iii). 
33. See also R. Singh and J. Strachan, "Privacy Postponed" [2003] European Human Rights Law Review Special Issue: Privacy 12-25. 34. Note also that a number of distinguished commentators have argued in favour 
of maintaining a clear distinction between privacy and confidence: see Law Commis- 
sion, Breach of Confidence, No. 110 (Cmnd 8388), 5; R. WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMA- TION, PRIVACY AND THE LAW (Oxford, 1989), pp. 132-4; Dame Mary Arden, The Future 
of the Law of Privacy" (1998-99) King's College Law Journal 1, 5; Lord Bingham, 
"Should There Be a Law to Protect Personal Rights to Privacy?" [1996] European Human Rights Law Review 450, 461. 
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Thus, we note indicatively the following welcome trends, as road 
markers on the route towards a conceptually rigorous and suitable 
privacy action: 
a) The absence of a need to show a pre-existing relationship of 
confidence where private information is involved, and the 
recognition that publication of private material in and 
of itself constitutes a "detriment" 
One welcomes the unshackling of the power of the court to re- 
strain the publication of private information from the requirement 
that a pre-existing confidential relationship exist, a step definitively 
recognised in Douglas (No. 1) and Venables v News Group Newspa- 
pers.35 Judicial concentration upon the question of who has published 
the offending material, a core issue in confidence actions, appears 
therefore where the publication of private material is concerned to be 
superseded by a welcome focus upon what has been published.36 This 
change has, no doubt, been encouraged by the Human Rights Act 
even if it built upon previous authority37, and it has made possible 
the granting of the orders contra mundum in the Venables and Bell 
cases and the expanded scope given to the protection of private life in 
A v. B plc and Campbell v. MGN Ltd38. The expanded protection of 
human privacy is reflected in the Sunday People's capitulation in the 
Sara Cox case before the issue reached the court, following their pub- 
lication of photographs taken of a well-known English radio pre- 
senter while on her honeymoon on a private beach. 
The assumption by the Court of Appeal in Campbell that intru- 
sion into privacy could in itself constitute a detriment, which is a re- 
quired element in order to bring a successful action for breach of 
confidence, is also to be welcomed. By virtue of these fundamental 
alterations of the existing law of confidence as it pertains to private 
information, a new legal path (albeit of a narrow and twisted nature) 
has been opened up for the protection of privacy as an essential ele- 
ment of the human personality. This may now extend to ensure a 
remedy in a case similar to that of Kaye. 
Nevertheless, as discussed below, the question of the extent to 
which information which has entered already into the public sphere, 
or which can be described as "private" but not easily as "confidential", 
can be protected by the breach of confidence action remains unde- 
cided. In the light of the Peck judgement of the European Court of 
Human Rights, this is a serious area of uncertainty. There also re- 
35. [2001] Fam 430. See also the dictum of Lord Goff in AG v Guardian Newspa- 
pers (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 281, which laid the foundations for this development. 
36. See A. Morgan, op cit., 451-2. 
37. See H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, "Confidence and Privacy: A Re-Examina- 
tion" [1996] Cambridge Law Journal 447. 
38. [2002] EWCA Civ 1373, CA. 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Wed, 20 May 2015 19:20:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
144 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 52 
mains significant uncertainty (and excessive deference to press inter- 
ests) as to what will constitute a violation of privacy, which becomes 
a particularly pertinent issue where public figures are involved. 
b) Public figures 
Writing nearly twenty years ago, one of us complained that the 
common law seemed to make little difference between those who 
were born to publicity, those who sought it, and those who had it 
thrust upon them.39 The argument was mainly directed against the 
plight of victims of sexual crime who had to suffer the extra indignity 
of having their suffering publicised for what was often little less than 
a desire on behalf of the publisher to satisfy prurient interest in sex- 
ual crimes. In the English common law, this 'defect' was gradually 
remedied by means of typically piece-meal and un-principled legisla- 
tion40 while in the United States such activity still remains possible, 
justified by a warped appreciation of the First Amendment.41 
The failure to distinguish between those seeking publicity in par- 
ticular circumstances and those who have publicity thrust upon them 
has remained a recurring feature of English law and popular opinion. 
Individuals having the status of public figures have been viewed as 
fair game, irrespective of how they acquired public status, the cir- 
cumstances of the privacy intrusion, or the link between the intru- 
sion and the nature of the public interest in the individual 
concerned.42 How rigidly inimical English attitudes have been on this 
point towards victims of press intrusion can be seen from a statement 
39. B. Markesinis, "The Right to be Let Alone v. Freedom of Speech" in (1986) 
Public Law, 67-82, reproduced as chapter seventeen in FOREIGN LAW AND COMPARA- 
TIVE METHODOLOGY: A SUBJECT AND A THESIS (Oxford: Hart, 1997). For dicta in cases 
see: Woodward v. Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760 at 765 per Bridge LJ; Lennon v. News 
Group Newspapers [1978] FSR 573. 
40. Such as s. 4 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 (granting anonym- 
ity to victims of rape-related offences (narrowly defined), the Criminal Justice Act 
1987 and then, finally, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1991 and the related 
Statutory Instrument 1336/1992 of October 1992. The question of the possible ano- 
nymity of the accused has not yet been addressed; the very recent case of the televi- 
sion presenter John Lesley, accused by the media of committing rape in the media, 
and the adverse publicity he had to put up with for nearly ten months until the Crown 
Prosecution Service decided to drop the prosecution against him (without any details 
of the reasons for this decision given in public), reveals another gap in our law and 
one which led the Lord Chief Justice to express serious reservations about this form of 
"trial by the media" (interview granted on 31 July 2003). It also shows the drawbacks 
(in terms of human suffering as much as legal inconsistency) of incrementally 'closing' 
the gaps of English law by constant tinkering, rather than attempting to identify con- 
sistent underlying principles that should apply across the board. 
41. E.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 US 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029; The Florida 
Star v. B.J.F., 491 US 524, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105. 
42. See for example Bridge L.J.'s comments in Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 
WLR 760: "It seems to me that those who seek and welcome publicity of every kind 
bearing upon their private lives so long as it shows them in a favourable light are in 
no position to complain of an invasion of their privacy by publicity which shows them 
in an unfavourable light". 
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made by the former Chairman of the Press Complaints Commission 
(in those days the Press Council), Lord Wakeham, when asked to 
comment about a television play portraying an entirely fictitious con- 
versation of the late Princess of Wales with a psychiatrist. Asked 
whether the programme43 violated her privacy he replied: "Diana 
[sic] has sacrificed her right to privacy by going on television so, I 
think, she is fair game to be publicly analysed."44 
By contrast, in French and German law we find a far more 
nuanced approach as to when a distinction will be made between 
public and private figures. In both legal systems, the category of per- 
son matters less than the nature of the activity or information in 
question. Since this is a 'developing' area of the law as far as English 
law is concerned, it is worth presenting these foreign approaches in 
some detail in order to demonstrate the wealth of experience one 
finds in both these jurisdictions when it comes to making such dis- 
tinctions. The manner in which excessive rigidity is avoided between 
the public/ private dichotomy is as notable as is the fact that the pri- 
vacy rights of public figures are not summarily dismissed. 
In France, the Cour de cassation has adopted a consistent posi- 
tion that << everyone whatever his rank, birth, fortune, present or fu- 
ture occupation, is entitled to a right to privacy >>.45 However, 
infringements on someone's privacy may sometimes be held to be le- 
gitimate, especially when public figures are concerned. Thus, in the 
wake of the controversy surrounding the imposition of a ban on the 
publication of Le Grand Secret by Frangois Mitterrand's doctor,46 
French judges seem more willing to recognise a right of the public to 
know about public figures' health, whenever ill-health could je- 
opardise the smooth running of the public figure's function or man- 
date.47 Even when the revealed personal information in question has 
no link to official functions, the most recent case-law dealing with 
claims from celebrities seems to be more lenient and in favour of pub- 
lication than when anonymous citizens are concerned.48 Neverthe- 
less, public figures are still entitled to the protection of the law of 
privacy, and the recent case law represents the development of a 
43. Michael Grade, chief executive of the television channel Channel 4, described 
this programme as "an exercise in exploitation". 
44. The Times, 2 May 1996, p. 16. 
45. Civ. 1ire 23 October 1990, Bull. civ., n'222. 
46. In the Grand Secret case relating to undue disclosure of the former President 
of the Republic Francois Mitterrand's illness, the Cour d'appel in Paris prohibited 
publication of the entire book in which the revelations took place. The decision how- 
ever remains controversial and was probably motivated by the fact that the disclosure 
was done in breach of professional confidence by Frangois Mitterrand's former doctor. 
See E. Agostini, "Le grand secret", D. 1996, p. 58; G. Memeteau, "L'honneur d'un Pr6s- 
ident", G.P.1996.II., p. 754. 
47. See, C.A. Paris 5 December 1997, D.1998, I.R., 32, which cautiously follows 
this approach. 
48. Cf. Civ. 1ire 23 April 2003, D.2003, no28, p. 1854, note C. Bigot. 
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more nuanced approach than applied hitherto, which recognises the difference between public figures and anonymous citizens and still requires that strong public interest justification be demonstrated where substantial breaches of privacy are at stake. German law has recognised this basic distinction between pri- vate and public figures, while taking pains to draw further sub-divi- sions where dealing with the publication of images, in particular between images of permanent public figures (e.g., Heads of State and famous actors, scientists or athletes)49 and those of individuals who attract public attention only for a limited period of time (e.g., victims of crime) and who then recede back into anonymity and have their rights of privacy (as fully private figures) eventually revived.50 The attempt to define and distinguish between these two catego- ries has led to an interesting case law. Factors to be taken into ac- count include participation in significant historical, political, social or cultural events and achievements of some importance.51 However the result is also affected by the right of the press to identify, focus on and cultivate, within limits defined by law, possible issues of future public interest.52 The second category of public figures - those who attract public attention for a limited time due to specific events - are accorded a higher level of protection. Nevertheless, even "permanent" celebrities may successfully invoke privacy rights in particular as far as the intimate sphere of their lives is concerned. The publication of secretly taken photographs howing an ac- tress naked in her private surroundings was thus prohibited, despite the fact that this actress had previously featured naked in films and had consented to the publication of nude photos on several separate occasions.53 The same decision was taken in the case of a prominent football star whose penis had accidentally slipped out of his shorts during a game: a journal had published a large-sized copy of this im- age and thereby had additionally enlarged the relevant section of the photo.54 As their fame and importance for the public diminishes (e.g., ageing politicians, actors, or singers), even so-called 'absolute' or 'per- manent' public figures will regain a stronger privacy claim when the publication of their images is in dispute.55 They will, however, always 
49. So-called absolute Personen der Zeitgeschichte. 50. So-called relative Personen der Zeitgeschichte. 51. Schwerdtner in Munchner Kommentar zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch (3rd edn 1999), §12 no. 171. 
52. BVerfGE NJW 2000, 1021, 1026 (Caroline von Monaco). 53. OLG Hamburg AfP 1982, 41 (Dolly Dollar). 54. OLG Hamburg ArchPR 1972, 150. 55. See, e.g., the decision LG Berlin 19 November 1996, NJW 1997, 1155 (dis- cussed in more detail below). 
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remain closely connected to 'their' particular time or era, and the 
publication of historical pictures will not be prevented.56 
Figures who, by contrast, attract attention only for a very limited 
period of time - usually due to a singular event - include individuals 
who are closely connected to celebrities (e.g., family members, friends 
or lovers), who hold a public office (e.g., public prosecutors) or enter 
the public stage due to their profession (e.g., criminal lawyers in 
high-profile cases), who are involved in criminal proceedings (e.g., 
suspects and convicts) or who become involved in public events by 
mere coincidence (e.g., victims of crime, natural catastrophes or traf- 
fic accidents). Their right to remain anonymous is again weighed 
against the right of the public to be informed, and the publication of 
images will remain confined to the incident which brought them to 
the attention of the public in the first place. 
Similarly, in France, the publication of intrusive images and in- 
formation by newspapers will be more carefully controlled where only 
'temporary' public figures are involved.57 Even in this context, the 
importance and particular circumstances of an event or of the publi- 
cation of an image may still outweigh the privacy rights of these 'tem- 
porary' public figures. For example, judges will consider whether the 
focus of a photo of a public event that contains the image of the plain- 
tiff is centred upon the public event itself or on the plaintiff.58 Never- 
theless, French law (as German law) adopts a nuanced approach, 
distinguishing between various categories of public figure as well as 
between various types of disclosed personal information, while ena- 
bling even 'permanent' public figures to avail of privacy rights when 
intimate information is at stake in the absence of clear public 
interest. 
This nuanced, context-specific approach that recognises that 
public figures do not sign away their privacy rights simply by virtue 
of being famous seems to be emerging in England, in the post-Human 
Rights Act 'confidence'-linked actions. Recent case law is pleasantly 
replete with dicta to the effect that public figures, too, are entitled to 
56. Even in France where the publication of public figures' pictures must be justi- 
fied by a topical event and confined to this event, there is no doubt that publication of 
historical pictures is permissible. Thus pictures of a politician's funerals cannot be 
used to illustrate a story that has no bearing on the politician's death (T.G.I. Paris 19 
May 1999, Legipresse, 1999, n°165-I, p. 116). But there is no restriction on the publi- 
cation of one of the symbolic photos of the May 1968 events, as it was deemed to have 
become part of French national history (T.G.I. Nanterre 9 June 1998, Legipresse, 
1999, n°161-I, p. 52). 
57. See Civ. lbre 20 February 2001, n°9823/471, after the terrorist attack at RER 
Saint Michel Station in Paris. 
58. See Civ. 1are 25 January 2000, D.2000, Somm. com., p. 270, obs. C. Caron; 
JCP.2000.II.10257, Conclusions Jerry Sainte-Rose: "if the complaining person is not 
the main subject of the photo but only one of the component elements of a whole pub- 
lic subject, he should not be allowed to oppose to the publication of the photo on the 
ground of privacy and image rights". 
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have their privacy protected. Lord Woolf thus remarked in A v. B 
plc:59 
"Where an individual is a public figure he is entitled to have his 
privacy respected. A public figure is entitled to a private life." 
This comes, however, with the realisation that he 
". . .should recognise that because of his public position he must 
expect and accept that his actions will be more closely scrutinised by 
the media." 
How far this intrusion can go is a matter of some dispute, and 
Lord Woolfs comments on the extent of privacy rights of public 
figures in A v B plc are in certain respects very problematic. We shall 
return to this in examining the limitations of the confidence cases. 
But the general position about public figures is no longer in doubt: 
they, too, have privacy rights. 
In Campbell v. MGN Ltd.,60 the Master of the Rolls seems to 
have re-stated and even expanded the position set out by Woolf when 
he said: 
"For our part we would observe that the fact that an individual 
has achieved prominence on the public stage does not mean that his 
private life can be laid bare by the media. We do not see why it should 
necessarily be in the public interest that an individual, who has been 
adopted as a role model, without seeking this distinction, should be 
demonstrated to have feet of clay." 
Compared to Lord Woolfs full statement in A v. B plc, this seems 
to show much greater sensitivity towards privacy rights. This diver- 
gence is discussed below as one of the points of uncertainty and ten- 
sion produced by the stretching of the confidence action: for now, it 
will suffice to note that the confidence cases appear to see the UK 
courts taking the first steps towards the nuanced approach developed 
by the French and German courts and towards the recognition of the 
entitlement of all to a degree of privacy. 
c) Public places 
English law has not only changed in so far as it now accepts that 
even public figures may have privacy rights; it has also changed quite 
radically by accepting that their privacy rights may extend to things 
that they do in public places. The Campbell decision by the Court of 
Appeal seems to support this proposition by treating an appearance 
in a public place (albeit en route to a private place to attend a Narcot- 
ics Anonymous meeting) as capable of giving rise to a breach of confi- 
dence action, as does the Douglas No. 2 case with its acceptance that 
images of a wedding with numerous guests (other photos of which 
59. Op. cit., para. 11 (xii). 
60. [2002] EWCA Civ 1373, para. 41. 
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would appear in a mass circulation magazine) could still attract the 
protection of the confidence action. 
This general position that privacy rights may extend to acts done 
in public places was fully analysed and justified in the Caroline cases 
in Germany and has also been adopted in some common law jurisdic- 
tions such as Canada6' and California.62 This position is well estab- 
lished in French law where protection of privacy no longer relies on 
spatial considerations - whether the activity is conducted in a private 
or public sphere - but tends to depend upon the significance and the 
nature of the activity carried out.63 
The decision in Peck v. UK64 by the European Court of Human 
Rights confirms that such an approach is now required to satisfy the 
Article 8 right to privacy in the ECHR. The Strasbourg court in Peck 
found that the UK was in violation of Articles 8 and 13 of the ECHR 
by failing to provide a legal remedy to prevent the publication of the 
CCTV footage of Mr. Peck's suicide attempt, which occurred in a pub- 
lic place. This decision appears to depart from previous Strasbourg 
case law that had viewed the taking of photographs or other images 
of subjects in a public place as not violating an applicant's right to 
privacy.65 The Court's decision in Peck now however recognises that 
there is "a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public 
context, which may fall within the scope of 'private life'".66 The fact 
that the event in question occurred in a public place and had no qual- 
ity of secrecy or confidence was not itself a bar to the plaintiff having 
his right to privacy vindicated. 
The Strasbourg court in Peck was prepared to draw a distinction 
for the purposes of privacy between different sets of factual circum- 
stances where the events in question occur in a public place: the pub- 
lic nature of the place and activity in question was balanced against 
the subsequent disclosure of the intrusive CCTV footage without any 
attempt to conceal Mr. Peck's identity. The judgement also suggests 
that foreseeability on the part of the subject as to whether the privacy 
of their actions in a public place would be respected will be an impor- 
tant consideration. In particular, the Court stated: 
61. Editions Vice Versa v. Aubry [19981 5 BHRC 437. 
62. Cal. Civil Code, s. 1708.8. The statute makes it a tort to trespass or use a 
'visual or auditory enhancing device' - e.g., a telephoto lens or a directional 
microphone - to film or record a person engaging in personal or familial activities 
under circumstances in which the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy. A 
person violating the statute is liable for up to three times the amount of special and 
general damages, plus punitive damages, and also may be enjoined. 
63. See, C.A. Paris 6 October 1999, D.2000, Somm. com., p. 268, obs. A. Lepage: "a 
wedding, notwithstanding that it is celebrated in a public place, remains of a private 
nature and therefore cannot be filmed without the spouses' consent". 
64. (2003) E.H.R.R. 287 (App. No. 00044647/98). 
65. Friedl v. Austria (1995) 21 EHRR 83. 
66. Op cit., para. 57. 
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"The present applicant was in a public street but he was not 
there for the purposes of participating in any public event and he was 
not a public figure. It was late at night, he was deeply perturbed and 
in a state of some distress.. .the footage was disclosed to the media 
for further broadcast and publication purposes. . .The applicant's 
identity was not adequately, or in some cases not at all, masked in 
the photographs and footage so published and broadcast. He was 
recognised by certain members of his family and by his friends, 
neighbours and colleagues.. .As a result, the relevant moment was 
viewed to an extent which far exceeded any exposure to a passer-by 
or to security observation ... and to a degree surpassing that which 
the applicant could possibly have foreseen when he walked in Brent- 
wood on 20 August 1995." 
This aspect of the decision appears to shift considerably the 
boundaries of what is regarded as private life under Article 8, and to 
recognise that intrusion into personal privacy cannot be justified sim- 
ply by virtue of that intrusion occurring while the person concerned 
was present in a public place.67 The Campbell and Douglas decisions 
indicate that the English courts will be prepared to adopt a similar 
approach, which is also broadly similar to the German and French 
approaches, even if Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright appeared rather 
bafflingly to regard Peck as solely concerned with identifying the 
need for the UK to introduce a system of control for the distribution 
of CCTV footage. Serious concerns remain, however, as to the extent 
to which this approach can be fitted within the straitjacket of the con- 
fidence action, which again will be dealt with below. 
d) Tele lens and short lens 
Another welcome development is the possibility that the English 
courts by means of the law of confidence may be willing and able to 
provide a remedy when tele or short lenses are used to intrude upon 
personal privacy. Previously, this would not even be an issue, as Kaye 
and Bernstein had clearly established that privacy interests could 
only be protected if actual trespass or other forms of punishable in- 
trusion (e.g., interference with telephone lines) could be established. 
Another reason why this issue did not arise was because telephoto 
lenses (or, the reverse, short lenses) tend to be used on celebrities 
from a distance. Since public figures received even less protection 
than private ones, the point was hardly discussed by our judges or 
academic commentators. 
It was the Caroline cases in Germany, in the middle of the 1990s, 
that first pointed out that the use of the telephoto lens was an indica- 
tion that the potential claimants would not have approved of their 
67. See also PG and JH v. UK, ECHR 25th September 2001 and R v. Loveridge (2001) EWCA Crim 973. 
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being photographed, and that was a factor which the courts could 
take into account in deciding whether an actionable violation of pri- 
vacy had taken place. 
A similar development has occurred in French law.68 But no such 
thing initially occurred in English law. It had to take the huge furore 
against the press that followed Princess Diana's death before the 
Press Complaints Commission was prepared to introduce into its 
Code of Practice in article 3 (ii) the statement that "The use of long 
lens photography to take pictures of people in private places without 
their consent is unacceptable." Note, of course, that the Press Com- 
plaints Commission has not come to accept that the same might be 
true of photos taken of individuals who are in public places, some- 
thing which has now happened in California69 (and has yet to be 
challenged on constitutional grounds). 
However, the development of the law of confidence now appears 
to ensure that such use of tele and short lenses to photograph individ- 
uals in either private or public places may be relevant in determining 
whether a legitimate expectation of privacy was being infringed. Lord 
Woolf in A v. B plc suggested that breach of confidence could extend 
to cover "an intrusion in a situation where a person can reasonably 
expect his privacy to be respected",70 and following the sound logic of 
the German courts in the Caroline cases, the use of special lenses 
should indicate that a "reasonable expectation of privacy" was being 
intruded upon. Again, the piecemeal development of the law of confi- 
dence seems sensibly to be bringing English law closer to the position 
adopted in German and French law. 
e) Towards a balancing of competing interests 
A gradual convergence with the German and French approaches 
can also be detected when it comes to examining how the courts have 
balanced the rights of privacy and freedom of expression in the 
breach of confidence cases in the wake of the HRA. It is obviously 
often the business of the law to sort out clashes between competing 
values and interests. Given the importance of the potentially conflict- 
ing rights of expression and of personality and privacy for any demo- 
cratic state, striking an appropriate balance between the two sets of 
rights calls for wise and measured reactions, uninfluenced by reasons 
of political expediency (or its judicial equivalent). There are two pos- 
sible answers to the question of how this dilemma is to be resolved in 
the case of privacy rights. 
68. See T.G.I. Paris 29 May 1996, Legipresse, 1996, no135-I, p. 122. 
69. And, of course, in Germany after the Caroline decision, BVerfGE 101, 361 = 
NJW 2000, 1021, translated into English in Markesinis and Unberath, op. cit., pp. 
450 ff. 
70. See A v. B plc, op cit., para. 11 (x). 
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The first is to go down the road adopted in the United States. In 
Konigsberg v. State Bar,71 Mr Justice Black said: "I believe that the 
First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no 
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the 
men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to 
be done in this field.. ." Though this dictum appears in a dissent, and 
one can find, especially in earlier times, American justices arguing 
that "no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference"72 over others, it 
would appear that Justice Black's statement succinctly states the dis- 
like felt both by American judges73 and academics74 in balancing 
competing values against that of free speech. 
The second contrasting approach is to go down the road we have 
already taken in our law of defamation and attempt to weigh these 
interests, the one against the other, in the context of the facts of each 
case. In our law of defamation, some would argue that we have given 
a premium to reputation over speech; in the emerging law of 'privacy' 
protection one hopes that a true equilibrium will be attained, a priori 
favouring no value over the other. The first signs are that we may be 
heading in this direction. Lord Woolf in A v. B plc emphasised the 
need to strike a balance in applying the law of confidence between the 
requirements of the privacy guarantee in Article 8 of the ECHR and 
the guarantee of free expression in Article 10. He said: 
"There is a tension between the two articles which requires the 
court to hold the balance between the conflicting interests they are 
designed to protect. This is not an easy task but it can be achieved by 
the courts if, when holding the balance, they attach proper weight to 
the important rights both articles are designed to protect. Each arti- 
cle is qualified expressly in a way which allows the interests under 
the other article to be taken into account."75 
The same approach has been adopted by Butler-Sloss P. in Vena- 
bles and Bell: in the latter case, she refers to the "necessary balancing 
exercise between the need to protect confidentiality and the need to 
pay proper respect to the right of freedom of expression".76 This ap- 
proach certainly reflects the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court in 
Peck and other cases, where freedom of expression (while given due 
weight) is not treated as a 'trump card' over other rights. (In Peck, the 
Strasbourg court specifically adopted a proportionality approach, bal- 
71. 366 US 36, 61 (1961). 
72. Ullmann v. United States, 350 US 422, 428 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.). 
73. See, also Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865, esp. 882 ff. 
(1960). 
74. Thus, among the voluminous literature see: Robert B. McKay, The Preference 
for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182 (1959); Laurent Frantz, The First Amendment in 
the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the 
First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821 (1962). 
75. Op cit., para. 6. 
76. Op cit., para. 58. 
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ancing the public interest in deterring crime and freedom of expres- 
sion against Mr. Peck's right to personal privacy.77) As discussed 
below, this reflects the approaches of the German and French courts 
as well, but what is not yet clear in the British context is how this 
balancing will be carried out, and in particular the extent to which 
privacy rights are given due weight and value. As with the other ar- 
eas of progress that we have identified, the nature and extent to 
which privacy interests are protected by means of the breach of confi- 
dence action in the wake of the HRA remains uncertain. 
4. UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS 
Despite these welcome developments in the way UK courts ap- 
proach privacy issues, the picture is not, as noted above, all rosy. In 
this section we shall thus look at a number of crucial issues which, 
despite the progress made thus far, still remain unresolved. A com- 
mon factor underpins the uncertainties that remain: the reliance on 
confidentiality to address privacy issues instead of developing a 
proper tort of privacy has so far prevented the courts from addressing 
these questions as carefully as they should. This lack of clarity dem- 
onstrates the conceptual distortions induced by reliance on confiden- 
tiality as opposed to a more explicitly privacy-orientated approach. 
All of the issues identified below have been addressed by the French 
and German courts as part of their development of a comprehensive 
and clear privacy law, forming part of a wider need to protect human 
personality in all its manifestations. While we do not argue for the 
automatic transplantation of this foreign learning into the UK legal 
context, we suggest that in every one of the five issues we examine 
below, an approach based upon the recognition of an explicit privacy 
action as essential to upholding human dignity would yield greater 
clarity, rigour, and coherence than the muddled results brought 
about by piecemeal extensions of the confidentiality principles. The 
study of foreign law can help demonstrate this; and it should not be 
excluded simply be the fact that English judges became more intro- 
spective in the mid 20th century than their predecessors were during 
the 19th. 
a) Presumptive preference for one interest over another? 
To adopt the view that a balance has to be struck between the 
competing values, as the English courts appear to have done (as dis- 
cussed above) is one thing; to maintain in addition that there is no 
'presumptive' preference for one over the other is the next and more 
77. See R. Singh and J. Strachan, "Privacy Postponed?" [2003] European Human 
Rights Law Review Special Issue: Privacy 2003 12, 21-22. 
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subtle step. Our courts may be moving in that direction; but the point 
has yet to be clarified conclusively. 
As noted above, in A v. B78 Lord Woolf noted the ". . .tension 
between the two articles [Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention] which 
require the court to balance between the conflicting interests they are 
designed to protect." Though he expressed no view that one value 
should prevail over the other, one cannot ignore the fact that his deci- 
sion is peppered with statements which suggest that at least as far as 
public figures are concerned, the right to publish seems to come first. 
The presumptive primacy of free speech also seems to be implicit 
in Butler-Sloss P.'s judgments in Venables and Bell. In both judg- 
ments, the exceptional circumstances involved (including threats to 
the lives and mental health of the individuals concerned, who had in 
both cases become notorious as a consequence of their killing of small 
children while they themselves were very young adolescents) were 
cited as justifying the granting of orders contra mundum. While the 
emphasis in both decisions was on the special facts of each case, and 
Butler-Sloss P.'s comments should perhaps be confined to the ex- 
traordinary circumstances involved, one must note the high thresh- 
old she seems to require in order to restrain press freedom where the 
publication of information relates to the identity of those who have 
committed criminal offences.79 
If these dicta seem to point in one direction, others would appear 
to be less emphatic. Lord Justice Sedley's views in Douglas (No. 1) 
thus deserve close scrutiny. For there, in a passage not affected by 
the subsequent Court of Appeal decisions in either A v. B and Camp- 
bell, he invoked the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
when he claimed that "Article 10 (i) [of the Convention] does not have 
the presumptive priority which is given, for example, to the First 
Amendment in the jurisprudence of the United States' courts."80 The 
approach was cited with approval by Mr Justice Lindsay in Douglas 
No. 2;81 and also seemed to have found favour by Lightman J. in 
Campbell v. Frisbee82 when considering section 12 (4) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Subsequently, these views of Lightman J. were con- 
sidered by the Court of Appeal in Campbell v. Frisbee83 and were not 
(expressly) overruled, though his judgment was. Notwithstanding the 
78. Op cit., para. 6. 
79. Bell, op cit., para. 59. 
80. Op cit., para. 135. Brooke L.J., at para. 49 appeared to share this view by 
"renouncing" implicitly a phrase used by Hoffmann L.J. in his earlier judgment in R v. 
Central Independent Television plc [1994] Fam 192, 203. Subsequently as Lord Hoff- 
mann he appeared to modify this statement in his Goodman lecture. See also R v. 
BBC (ex p. Pro-life Alliance) [2003] UKHL 23, 15 May 2003. 
81. Op. cit., para. 186 (v). 
82. 14 March 2002. See also the comments of Simon-Browne LJ in Cream Hold- 
ings Ltd v Banerjee [2003] EWCA Civ 103, paras. 51 and 53. 
83. [2002] EWCA Civ. 1374, para. 25. 
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provisions of s. 12 (4) of the HRA, with its requirement for the courts 
in applying the Convention in domestic law to pay "particular regard" 
to the importance of the freedom of expression and especially to "jour- 
nalistic, literary or artistic material", the importance of freedom of 
expression is not allowed to completely overshadow the claims of pri- 
vacy. In particular, hypothetical or de minimis restrictions on publi- 
cation should not be given presumptive primacy over the protection of 
a core element of the human personality such as privacy. Effective 
balancing of both rights involves giving both due weight, and suitable 
judicial dicta to this effect will play an important role in making this 
clear. 
The pains to which judges in other jurisdictions have gone to bal- 
ance conflicting human rights without giving presumptive priority to 
one or the other are considerable and noteworthy since we submit 
that on the philosophical position of whether 'to balance or not to bal- 
ance' the competing interests, English law has always been more 
akin to these European systems than it has been to the "brutal sim- 
plicity of the First Amendment."84 More particularly, we emphasise 
the German approach, which - based on the notion that fundamental 
rights (apart from human dignity) are, in principle, accorded the 
same status - demands that courts try to reconcile conflicting posi- 
tions as best they can and give pre-eminence to one value only after 
due consideration of the particular circumstances characterising each 
and every case. The outcome of the exercise is thereby open, and the 
balance must be found time and time again on the basis of the facts of 
each case.85 The following statement of the Landgericht Berlin, typi- 
cal for the approach adopted by German courts on all levels of the 
system, may serve as an illustration of this attitude: 
"In balancing the personality rights of the applicant with the 
freedom of the press invoked by the respondent, it is of crucial impor- 
tance to identify the sphere of life into which the activity of the appli- 
cant fell when he featured in the pornographic film-clip. This 
determines the standard by which the press coverage of the respon- 
dent must be measured. For protection of privacy and freedom of ex- 
pression are accorded the same status by the Constitution (BGH 
NJW 1981, 1366). As far as resulting conflicts can only be resolved by 
restricting one and protecting the other, the choice as to which right 
should prevail in the concrete case must be based on a balance of 
values and interests which upholds the equal constitutional status of 
84. The words belong to the late Lord Wilberforce and come from his Foreword to 
Basil Markesinis' Always on the Same Path: Essays on Foreign Law and Comparative 
Methodology, vol II, (Oxford: Hart, 2001), p. xiii. 
85. BVerfGE 30, 173, 195; 35, 202, 225; 59, 231, 261 ff.; 67, 213, 228; 81, 278, 292; 
91, 1, 21. This position is met with approval in academic literature, see, e.g., Jarass in 
Jarass/Pieroth, Grundgesetz fuir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (6th edn 2002), 
Vorb. Vor Art. 1 no. 49. 
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both rights and takes into account the privacy interests and the inter- 
ests of the Press worthy of protection under the particular circum- 
stances of the case."86 
Similar considerations can be found in other systems not in- 
cluded in our study. For present purposes Israel may offer an excel- 
lent illustration since this is a system which - though in many 
respects influenced by contemporary American jurisprudential ideas 
- has, on this point, opted for what we have termed above the 'Euro- 
pean balancing approach'. Thus Chief Justice Barak once remarked 
that: 
"the solution of these conflicts does not lie in ignoring one princi- 
ple and completely preferring another. Rather, the proper method is 
to place the principles side by side, giving appropriate weight to each, 
and balancing them at the point of conflict. This is a 'process of plac- 
ing competing values on a scale, and choosing those that, after the 
weighing process, are stronger under the circumstances."'87 
A balancing approach similar to that found in Germany (and 
Israel) can also be found in France where privacy and freedom of ex- 
pression both receive due consideration.88 
We thus submit that a similar approach should be adopted in 
this jurisdiction, and made clear by appropriate judicial dicta before 
the current uncertainty is perpetuated and encourages more judicial 
disputes. To put it differently, approaching privacy issues through 
the rubric of confidentiality may confuse the issue and result in an 
excessive presumptive prioritisation of free speech. When balancing 
free speech against privacy in circumstances where the confidential 
interest is low but where privacy concerns remain considerable (where, for example, an intrusion occurs in a public place), the root of 
the existing remedy in the law of confidence may influence judges to 
place a lower value on privacy considerations than is warranted or 
appropriate. 
The breach of confidence action has also hitherto had a very lim- 
ited scope of application, and restrictions on free publication have 
only been imposed in limited and incrementally outlined circum- 
stances, with free speech given (by some judges) presumptive priority 
86. LG Berlin 19 November 1996, NJ\)V 1997, 1155. 
87. Hevra Kadisha (Burial Society) of the Jerusalem Community v. Lionel Aryeh Kastenbaum, Civil Appeal 294/91 (P.D. 46(2) 464 at no. 8 of his judgement (English translation) in B.S. Markesinis' Website of Israeli Legal Material at University Col- lege London/University of Texas at Austin, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/global_law (ref- 
erences omitted). These, incidentally, are cases dealing with the thorny problem of horizontal effect of human rights where Israeli eclecticism has, once again, led many 
of the country's jurists to seek inspiration in German doctrine. The lodestar case here has been the famous Luth decision of the German Constitutional Court. 88. See Civ. lere 23 April 2003, D.2003, n°28, p. 1854, note C. Bigot, expressly 
approving the Cour d'appel for having reached equilibrium between privacy rights 
and freedom of expression. 
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except in cases involving a clear breach of confidence. Developing an 
adequate privacy law for the UK in contrast will require clear gui- 
dance by the higher courts that the protection of privacy, not the rem- 
edying of a breach of confidence, should be the guiding value of this 
new expanded action, and that privacy is a right emanating from 
human dignity which must be given due weight when balanced 
against the claims of free speech. Otherwise, the distorting effect of 
squeezing privacy into the straitjacket of confidence will distort the 
application and development of the law of privacy. 
b) Revelation in the public interest 
The same considerations arise where a defence of public interest 
is argued to justify a privacy violation. Of the five possible defences89 
to a claim for actionable violation of privacy that can be brought in a 
breach of confidence action, this is arguably the most significant. It 
also gives rise to perhaps the one core question in all privacy related 
disputes: who should decide when publication is justified in the pub- 
lic interest? Hitherto, this has been left to the Press Complaints Com- 
mission and other bodies. In the wake of the HRA, the courts have 
now begun to take over this role, as seen in Campbell and A v. B plc. 
If the courts are to fulfil this role well, this will require the develop- 
ment of a public interest test that incorporates the suitable balancing 
exercise as between free speech and privacy discussed above, while 
also factoring in other public interest considerations that may other- 
wise be neglected, such as the interest of the public in the rehabilita- 
tion of offenders.90 
The neglect of privacy as a value in the common law should not 
be carried over into how this test is framed and applied. Article 8 of 
the ECHR, now injected into the common law via s. 6 of the HRA with 
its requirement that the courts give indirect horizontal effect to the 
ECHR rights in developing the common law, requires due protection 
to be afforded to privacy. Equally, the importance of the public inter- 
est in protecting personal privacy has to be built into any public in- 
terest test. Thus far, much of the formulation of the public interest 
defence in A v. B plc and Campbell has tended to analyse the public 
interest as solely concerned with securing freedom of expression: the 
public interest in publication has been contrasted with the private 
interests of the individuals involved. This is inappropriate. For there 
is also a public interest in protecting personal privacy, as well as in 
securing other public goods such as the rehabilitation of criminals 
89. The other four are: (a) information is already in the public domain; (b) con- 
sent; (c) special immunity; and (d) lawful authority. The first of these raises nice 
problems which are discussed below. 
90. See Venables, op cit., note, and Bell, op cit., para. 59. 
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and the prevention of harassment. Butler-Sloss P. appeared to indi- 
cate as much in her judgments in Venables and Bell. 
The use of the law of confidence has probably contributed to this 
neglect. Breach of confidence actions have prior to the HRA involved 
a personal claim of confidence being balanced against a broader pub- 
lic interest in publication. Such an approach is no longer tenable 
under the HRA. Instead, due recognition of the importance of privacy 
as an essential value, as well as the other dimensions of the public 
interest, need to be factored into any application of the public interest 
test. Clear judicial dicta to this effect are again required. 
c) Public figures 2 
We have welcomed above the recognition by the English courts 
that public figures do not automatically surrender their entitlement 
to a private life simply by virtue of their celebrity. However, in the 
context of the application of the public interest test, the Court of Ap- 
peal has created unhappy confusion in A v. B plc between the ideas of 
what is in the public interest and what the public is interested in. 
This may nullify much of the progress in the confidence cases to- 
wards a nuanced approach to the privacy of public figures. In con- 
trast to the sensible approach seemingly adopted by the Master of the 
Rolls in Campbell towards the question as to when public figures re- 
tain their privacy, discussed above, Lord Woolf in A v. B plc seems 
almost too eager to accept that once the public figure status has been 
attained, much if not most of the individual's privacy rights are pre- 
sumptively lost to the public's interest to be informed about that ce- 
lebrity's life. This, at any rate, is how we read what Lord Woolf had to 
say after the lines already cited above, namely: 
"Even trivial facts relating to a public figure can be of great inter- 
est to readers and other observers of the media.. .In many of these 
situations it would be overstating the position to say that there is a 
public interest in the information being published. It would be more 
accurate to say that the public have an understandable and so legiti- 
mate interest in being told the information. ... The courts must not 
ignore the fact that if newspapers do not publish information which 
the public are interested in, there will be fewer newspapers published, 
which will not be in the public interest." 
With the greatest respect to Lord Woolf, both the italicised 
sentences from his judgment are debatable. 
First, the assumption that if the public has an "understandable" 
interest in the information it also has a "legitimate interest" in re- 
ceiving it comes dangerously close to accepting that everything that 
interests the public should be published in the public interest - some- 
thing which the learned Lord himself tried to renounce in his preced- 
ing sentence. To put it differently, in practice the dividing line 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Wed, 20 May 2015 19:20:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2004] CONCERNS AND IDEAS ABOUT DEVELOPING ENGLISH LAW 159 
between the two notions as expressed by the Lord Chief Justice 
seems to us to be rather flimsy. Any attempt to equate what elements 
of the public are interested in reading with the "public interest" is 
very questionable, and runs the risk of eroding the protected sphere 
of "confidential" private information. Professor Wacks has noted that 
the adoption of a similar approach in the US - where a defence to a 
privacy action may be made out if a newspaper can show that publi- 
cation was "newsworthy" in that it attracted a degree of public atten- 
tion - has "effectively demolished" the US private-facts tort.91 
Mackay J. in A v. B and C (No. 1) in granting an injunction re- 
straining the publication of nude photographs of a pop singer took a 
more robust and in our opinion more appropriate view of the overlap 
between the public interest and what certain members of the public 
may be interested in: "some members of the public will be interested 
in looking at these pictures. That does not mean that there is any 
scrap of public interest in their publication."92 The view of the Su- 
preme Court Procedure Committee sitting under the chairmanship of 
Lord Justice Neill in 1991 in their Report on Practice and Procedure 
in Defamation, in rejecting the introduction of a public figure defence, 
is also worth citing: 
"(Such a defence) would mean, in effect, that newspapers could 
publish more or less what they liked, provided they were honest, if 
their subject happened to be within the definition of a 'public figure'. 
We think this would lead to great injustice. Furthermore it would be 
quite contrary to the tradition of our common law that citizens are 
not divided into different classes. What matters is the subject-matter 
of the publication and how it is treated, rather than who happens to 
be the subject of the allegations.""93 
We would suggest that these decisions reflect a more nuanced 
distinction between what elements of the public are interested in and 
what can be classified as being in the "public interest", and any at- 
tempt to conflate the two concepts should be firmly resisted. Ade- 
quate guidance needs to be given by the higher courts to this effect. 
Tugendhat and Christie have also made the argument that 
"there is no Strasbourg authority which supports the proposition 
that there is a public interest in 'gossip of a trivial nature' for infor- 
mation which the public have an 'understandable' (in the sense of 
prurient curiosity) interest in receiving. Despite the importance 
which the European institutions attach to the right to freedom of ex- 
91. R. Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom (Blackstone Press: London, 1995), p. 
113. See also G. Phillipson, "Judicial Reasoning in Breach of Confidence Cases: Not 
Taking Privacy Seriously?" [2003] EHRLR Special Issue: Privacy 2003 54, 62-65. 
92. A v B and C (No. 1), 2 March 2001, unreported (HC). See also the Australian 
case of Chappell v TCN Channel Nine (1988) 14 NSWLR 153 (NSW SC), per Hunt J. 
93. Supreme Court Procedure Committee, Report on Practice and Procedure in 
Defamation (July 1991). 
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pression, they always consider the content of the publication con- 
cerned and what its 'informational value' consists of."94 
Indeed, the Strasbourg court in a number of recent cases has 
treated publications that invade personal privacy as actually lacking 
any public interest for precisely that reason: strong penalties follow- 
ing such publication have been deemed by the Court to constitute a 
proportionate measure to protect personal privacy.95 
Secondly, the assumption made by Lord Woolf that if less lurid 
gossip is published there will be fewer publications (for which read 
tabloids) that indulge in this kind of publishing, and that this in turn 
will be against the public interest, is also a highly debatable proposi- 
tion. German privacy law has not hindered the considerable sales 
success of tabloids such as the Bild, while still protecting celebrities 
against gross privacy intrusions and contributing to the creation of a 
markedly less abusive media environment.96 
The more 'lean' formulation of the Master of the Rolls in the 
Campbell case97 thus seems preferable to us as a guiding dictum cou- 
pled, perhaps, with the rider one finds in some German decisions that 
this does not mean that the tabloid press has no role to play in our 
society. In this context a recent decision of the Federal Supreme 
Court put matters in the following way: 
"This freedom [of the Press] also exists in favour of the tabloid 
and sensational Press and thereby also for news which primarily sat- 
isfies the need of a more or less broad readership of superficial 
entertainment."98 
We submit that for present purposes the above will suffice and 
that further details can be left to the triers of fact to decide on the 
basis of the circumstances of each case when the public interest in a 
thriving press justifies publication. It is imperative however that this 
recognition that the concept of the public interest can extend to the 
publication of sensationalist material does not to turn into a rule of 
law, or a weighty guidance principle that few puny judges will dare to 
disregard, which could establish a near-blanket right to publish all 
details concerning a celebrity's private life. 
The privacy rights of public figures can be however eroded if 
they, themselves, have made misstatements about themselves. This, 
94. M. Tugendhat and I. Christie (eds.), The Law of Privacy and the Media, (Ox- 
ford: OUP, 2002), para. 10.62. 
95. Ibid. citing N v Portugal no. 20683/92 (1995) and Tammer v Estonia no. 
41205/98 (2001). 
96. See Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson Breach of Confidence as a Privacy 
Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era Mod. L. Rev. 660, 693 (2000). 
97. "For our part we would observe that the fact that an individual has achieved 
prominence on the public stage does not mean that his private life can be laid bare by 
the media": para. 41, Campbell, op cit. 
98. BGH 29 June 1999, NJW 1999, 2893 = VersR 1999, 1250, translated in 
Markesinis and Unberath, op. cit., pp. 469, 471. 
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understandably, revives the right of the Press to intrude in order to 
put the picture straight. The Campbell case, especially if one reads 
both the first instance judgment of Morland J. as well as the Court of 
Appeal decision, would also seem to suggest that this revival of the 
intrusion power must be exercised in a measured way so that if the 
disclosures then become excessive, the privacy rights of the victim 
are revived.99 Misstatements by a public figure should not mean that 
all aspects of their life become "fair game".100 
In this context, the English courts also should be very cautious in 
straying too far down the approach that appears to have been 
adopted in both A v B plc and Theakston v MGN101 that if a public 
figure can be deemed to be a "role model", then there is a real public 
interest in exposing any misbehaviour by that individual. As Phillip- 
son has argued, the courts should be very wary in making assump- 
tions as to who is a "role model", the actual capacity in which that 
person exercises an influence and whether revelations about an as- 
pect of that person's private life really performs any useful function if 
that aspect of their life is not directly related to the reason why that 
person is a role model.102 The notion advanced by Lord Woolf in A v B 
plc that a professional footballer is a moral role model for young peo- 
ple and that exposing misconduct by that footballer in their personal 
(as distinct from professional) life performs a valuable function ap- 
pears to us to be frankly quaint, naive and redolent of an earlier, 
more innocent sporting era. 
The Court of Appeal in A v. B plc may have made matters worse 
and more confused in this respect by conflating the traditional notion 
of "legitimate" with the term "understandable" public interest, imply- 
ing that public interest in a celebrity would open up all aspects of 
their private life. The lumping together of all public figures for the 
purpose of the judicial dicta issued in that case, coupled with the ten- 
dency of Lord Woolf to tolerate greater prying into such figures pri- 
vate lives, enhances unacceptably the public interest defence and 
should be re-defined at the first possible opportunity. This is a neces- 
sary first step in ensuring that the UK adequately protects the basic 
privacy rights of public figures. 
99. In Miss Campbell's case the Court of Appeal, unlike the Court of First In- 
stance, felt that this had not occurred since the disclosures by the Daily Mirror tabloid 
of her attendance at Narcotics Anonymous did not include clinical details of her 
treatment. 
100. See G. Phillipson, "Judicial Reasoning in Breach of Confidence Cases: Not 
Taking Privacy Seriously?" [2003] European Human Rights Law Review, op cit., 70. 
101. [2002] EWHC 137 (QB). 
102. Ibid., 68-69. 
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d) Material already in the public domain 
Another defence to a breach of confidence action whose implica- 
tions for the protection of privacy has been neglected thus far has 
been the defence of previous publication or where the material in 
question is already in the public domain. This defence has hitherto 
been usually a complete defence to a confidence action.'03 As dis- 
cussed above, the English courts now seem to accept that a breach of 
confidence action can arise even where the violation of privacy occurs 
in a public place. However, it is not at all clear as to where the confi- 
dence action will provide an adequate remedy when the material at 
issue has already been put into the public domain in some form and 
to some limited degree, but where dissemination of the material to a 
greater degree may constitute a gross violation of privacy.104 This 
material could not be described as 'confidential' in any meaningful 
sense, as it has already been released into the public domain, even if 
only to a minimal degree.'05 Nevertheless, if a remedy is not provided 
for where such material would violate privacy rights, then the UK 
would arguably be in violation of its ECHR obligations. This appears 
to be confirmed by the Peck decision. 
In that case it will be recalled that Mr. Peck carried out his sui- 
cide attempt in a public place with no attempt made to restrict its 
visibility. In addition, Mr. Peck later went public with his identity 
and the nature of the act in an attempt to prevent dissemination of 
the CCTV footage. Nevertheless, the Strasbourg court rightfully held 
that the subsequent publication of such images in the local and na- 
tional media constituted a gross intrusion into private life. The tradi- 
tional confidentiality defence based upon material being already in 
the public domain cannot serve therefore as a blanket defence to a 
privacy claim if compatibility with the ECHR is to be maintained. 
Once again, however, the existing case-law on the scope of the 
law of confidence in the wake of the HRA does not give clear guidance 
on this crucial issue, revealing again the distorting effect of utilising 
the confidence framework to attempt to substitute for the develop- 
ment of a full privacy action. In the recent case of Ellis v. Chief Con- 
103. See O. Mustad & Sons v. Dosen (1928) [1964] 1 WLR 109n. See also J. Morgan 
in "Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: "Hello" Trouble" [2003] 62 (2) Cam- 
bridge Law Journal 444, 452-457. 
104. See the useful discussion by Jonathan Morgan, ibid., 452-457. Morgan dis- 
agrees with Professor Tettenborn's heterorthodox suggestion (made in respect of the 
pre-HRA breach of confidence action) that if further disclosure of material already in 
the public sphere would cause additional harm, then an obligation of confidence re- 
mains enforceable within the parameters of the "traditional" breach of confidence ac- 
tion: see A.M. Tettenborn "Breach of Confidence, Secrecy and the Public Domain" 
(1982) 11 Anglo-American LR 273, 274. Morgan's critique of this suggestion is con- 
vincing, but in any case the lack of clarity on this point illustrates the inadequacy of 
relying upon the law of confidence when material has entered into the public sphere. 
105. See Morgan, op cit., 456-7452-457. 
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stable of Essex,l06 the Divisional Court was asked to rule on the 
compatibility with Article 8 of the ECHR of a new scheme to deter 
crime which relied upon displaying posters of convicted criminals in 
public locations. Lord Woolf CJ, in giving the judgement of the court, 
refused to give a declaration that the scheme was contrary in princi- 
ple to the ECHR until a specific individual case was brought before 
the court.107 However, he emphasised the need to take the impact 
upon the private life of the convicted criminals into consideration. 
The private life of his family should also be taken into account in 
framing and applying the scheme.108 The Court however avoided the 
issue of whether the police could have breached a duty of confidence 
to the individuals concerned, as previously suggested by Laws J. (as 
he was then) in Hellewell v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire,109 prefer- 
ring to deal with the case under the rubric of the HRA. 
This leaves open interesting questions. If private individuals, 
such as a neighbourhood watch group, had displayed such posters, 
they would not be subject to the HRA. Could their actions constitute a 
breach of confidence in appropriate circumstances? Ellis does not 
clarify this, with the court conspicuously steering clear of the ques- 
tion as to whether the law of confidence could apply. Such informa- 
tion would be public in nature and could not be described as 
'confidential' in any conventional sense of the term, but its publica- 
tion could again constitute a massive intrusion into the family life of 
the individuals involved. Similar scenarios, some of a considerably 
greater degree of invasiveness, can be imagined.1l0 The lack of clear 
direction on this illustrates the conceptual difficulties generated by 
the reliance upon the confidence framework to do a job for which it is 
conceptually ill-suited.1ll 
Lord Woolf in A v. B plc did appear to suggest that breach of 
confidence could extend to cover "an intrusion in a situation where a 
person can reasonably expect his privacy to be respected''.1l2 This 
could cover the Peck scenario, and would be on all fours with the 
Douglas decision. However, Lord Woolf also cited as a indicative 
guide to determining whether information was confidential the obser- 
vations of Gleeson CJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v 
Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd1l3 that 
106. [2003] EWHC 1321. 
107. See paras. 38 and 39. 
108. In the individual case that was originally in question, he expressed concern 
about the "police's uperficial reaction" to the risk of damage to the private life of Mr. 
Ellis' family. See para. 35. 
109. [1995] 1 WLR 804. 
110. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F 491 US 524, 109 S.Ct. 2603. 
111. See J. Morgan, op cit., 457. 
112. See A v. B plc, op cit., para. 11 (x). 
113. [2001] HCA 63. 
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"certain kinds of information about a person, such as information 
relating to health, personal relationships, or finances, may be easy to 
identify as private; certain kinds of activity, which a reasonable per- 
son, applying contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, 
would understand to be meant to be unobserved. The requirement 
that disclosure or observation of information or conduct would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in 
many circumstances a useful practical test of what is private."'14 
While doubtless the publication in Peck of the images "would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person", these images would not 
come within the part of Gleeson CJ's formulation that refers to acts 
intended to be "unobserved". Nor can they be classified credibly as 
"confidential" material in the original sense, given that the event oc- 
curred in a public place and was legitimately observed initially by 
CCTV. The same applies for similar reasons to the material at stake 
in Ellis and any similar cases. The requirement that disclosure be 
"highly offensive" in any case sets an excessively high standard, espe- 
cially when it comes to determining whether activities in a public 
place will be covered: it is most unlikely that "highly offensive" mate- 
rial will be obtainable in a public place except in exceptional circum- 
stances like Peck, yet intrusive disclosure of everyday non-offensive 
material obtained in public places may be extremely corrosive of per- 
sonal privacy. 
By its very nature, "confidential" material ceases to be confiden- 
tial on publication: the potential distortions that could therefore be 
produced by reliance upon confidence need to be addressed by the 
courts. It is imperative that the development of a privacy action en- 
sures that previous publication does not confer a carte blanche for the 
further publication of material that may seriously infringe upon the 
personal privacy and well-being of individuals. Just as the celebrity 
of public figures should not justify denial of the protection of privacy 
laws, previous publication should not automatically deprive individu- 
als of the benefits of privacy protection where appropriate. This prin- 
ciple should also extend to criminals like Mr. Ellis in a rehabilitation 
process: the assumption in much of legal and political debate in the 
UK that previous convictions or involvement in any capacity in the 
criminal process should render an individual fair game is very ques- 
tionable. Again, comparative experience illustrates how a coherent, 
nuanced and context-sensitive approach could be adopted in this 
context. 
We start with the U.S.A. where the First Amendment would ap- 
pear to dictate an extreme position. In The Florida Star v. B.J.F.115 
the US Supreme Court had to grapple with the scenario where infor- 
114. Ibid., para. 42. 
115. 491 US 524, 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989). 
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mation is in the public domain in a very limited manner but, as a 
result of the (subsequent) publication, reaches a much wider audi- 
ence with possible additional adverse consequences for the victim/ 
claimant. This is no place to note the nuanced differences in the vari- 
ous judgments delivered in that case. Suffice it to mention, that the 
majority had no hesitation in holding the publication to be protected 
by the Constitution. The authors of this article, however, declare 
their own preference for the approach adopted earlier by the Su- 
preme Court of California in the case of Briscoe v. Readers Digest,"16 
a decision which had to do with the extensive dissemination of the 
criminal record of a rehabilitated criminal. The judgment is com- 
mended to the readers of this article not only because of the kind of 
criteria the court thought ought to be considered before disposing this 
type of question but also because their considerable similarity with 
the Lebach arguments show how transplantable the German reason- 
ing can be even in a system such as the American which is - or ap- 
pears to be - philosophically so diametrically different to the 
German. 
Of course, the question that then arises as to how much of Bris- 
coe remains alive after Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn117 and The 
Florida Star v. B.J.F.? The latter two decisions suggested that mat- 
ters mentioned in public records (including judicial records) and mat- 
ters already in the public domain will receive First Amendment 
protection. Though neither decision had to address specifically previ- 
ously published but subsequently forgotten facts - as Briscoe did - 
their tenor seems too categorical to allow such a distinction. But law 
is about fine distinctions; and another (and on the whole not suffi- 
ciently exploited decision) of the United Supreme Court, would seem 
to suggest that there is some room for argument. The case was 
United States Department of Justice et al., Petitioners v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of Informationllsand it turned on the correct 
interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Its complex 
facts were as follows. 
On the basis of information provided by local, state, and federal 
law enforcement agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
compiles and maintains criminal identification records or "rap 
sheets" on millions of persons, which contain descriptive information 
as well as a history of arrests, charges, convictions, and incarcera- 
tions. After the FBI denied requests based on the Freedom of Infor- 
mation Act (FOIA), the respondents, a CBS news correspondent and 
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, filed suit in the 
District Court seeking the rap sheet for a particular individual as it 
116. 4 Cal. 3rd 529, 93 Cal Reptr. 866, 483 P. 2d 34 (1971). 
117. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
118. 489 U.S. 749,109 S. Ct 1468 (1989). 
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contained "matters of public record." The FBI had refused the FOIA 
request on the ground that that the rap sheets were protected by Ex- 
emption 7 (c) of the FOIA, which excludes from the statutes disclo- 
sure requirements records or information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes "to the extent that the production of such 
materials. . .could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwar- 
ranted invasion of privacy." Now, the crux of this case lies in the fact 
that much of the information contained in these rap sheets derives 
from a wide variety of official documents, most if not all having been 
in the public domain in a multiplicity of locations and documents. But 
those seeking this information were not trying to obtain the informa- 
tion they needed from the original source but from the documents 
prepared by the law enforcement agencies. 
The Supreme Court took the view that there was a substantial 
difference between "scattered bits of criminal history and a federal 
compilation". Quoting from a lecture"19 given by Associate Justice 
Rehnquist (as he was at that time), Justice Stevens endorsed the 
view that the fact that "an event is not wholly 'private' does not mean 
that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemina- 
tion of information." As stated previously, this decision ultimately 
turns on the construction of a Federal Statute and the discovery of 
the legislator's intent. But it is submitted that much of what is said 
in this judgment, including the quotation from Chief Justice's Rehn- 
quist's speech, could be applied to the cases considered in this section 
of our article to support the view that even in the USA, past events 
already in the public domain may, in appropriate circumstances, at- 
tract privacy protection. 
Turning now to Germany we note that privacy rights are viewed 
as part and parcel of the protection of human dignity, and the Peck 
case would have been viewed in line with the Strasbourg court's deci- 
sion as a straightforward infringement of human dignity, irrespective 
of the material having been in the public domain. German law (as a 
result of its tendency to see personal privacy as an aspect of human 
dignity) is anxious to avoid the so-called "Prangerwirkung" - putting 
individuals in the pillory. As a consequence, the plaintiffs in both El- 
lis and The Florida Star v. B.J.F. would probably have succeeded in 
Germany due to a) the fact that the privacy rights of victims of crime 
are strongly protected (especially in sex offences) and b) the impor- 
tance accorded to the re-integration of criminals once they have 
served their sentence.120 The above are subject to one or two caveats. 
119. Is an expanded right of privacy consistent with fair and effective law enforce- 
ment?, (1974) 23 KANSAS LAW REV. 1, 8. 
120. It should also be kept in mind that the Ellis scenario involved an infringement 
of fundamental rights by a public authority rather than the Press (with a potentially 
stronger level of protection granted to individuals vis-g-vis the state in horizontal re- 
lationships than in the private sphere), and that previous behaviour by an offender - 
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Thus, in dealing with pictures of persons involved in crime, distinc- 
tions are made in German law on the basis of the seriousness of the 
offence and the age of the person involved. When reporting on petty 
offences and crimes committed by minors, an additional interest of 
the public will thus have to be shown in order to justify the publica- 
tion of images, and pictures of mere suspects will require that sub- 
stantial evidence has been brought forward against them. 
Outside the criminal context, other German cases have also in- 
volved alleged violations of privacy where the limitation of informa- 
tion to a particular segment of the public domain was in question. As 
the Lebach decision of the Federal Constitutional Court has made 
clear, privacy rights in principle include the right to determine 
whether and in which way an individual's personality is discussed in 
public. This, however, is only the starting point in a nuanced 
analysis. 
In a case decided in 1992, the OLG Hamburg rejected the claim 
of an actress who had featured half-naked in a men's magazine and 
who then tried to keep one of these photos (passed on by the maga- 
zine) from being published in a daily newspaper which picked up on 
the story.121 These cases reflect the understandable wish of individu- 
als to limit images to a certain segment of the public (not least for 
commercial reasons), but both claims failed because the plaintiffs 
were categorised as absolute public figures and the press coverage in 
question - though spreading the images to a far greater audience - 
could invoke the public interest defence. Depending on the circum- 
stances of the case, privacy rights can, however, prevail.122 
In France, due to the personal nature of privacy, treated as an 
individual prerogative - a droit subjectif - the majority of French 
cases consider that individuals are, in principle, granted a personal 
e.g., strong moral statements - can strengthen the right of the press to inform about 
criminal convictions. See, e.g., BGH 5 May 1964 NJW 1964, 1471 ff. Briscoe, men- 
tioned above, is a decision that shows that even in the United States some courts 
share the view that these are interests worth protecting against unwarranted or ex- 
cessive intrusions. 
121. OLG Hamburg AfP 1992, 159 ff. A similar view was taken by the OLG Frank- 
furt in the case of the ex-GDR athlete Katharina Witt, who featured both in the Amer- 
ican and German editions of the Playboy - a fact this time reported on by a Sunday 
newspaper, which made use of an image copied down from the internet website of the 
magazine. 
122. In a decision dating back to 1985, the Federal Supreme Court had to deal with 
the claim of a male model, who had featured naked in a schoolbook on biology (to- 
gether with his son and other female models). Following the prohibition of the use of 
such pictures in Bavarian schools, the image was shown in a television documentary 
and thus spread far beyond the original 100,000 copies of the book. In this case, the 
plaintiff was successful. The BGH thereby left undecided the issue of whether the 
model was (or had become, due to the discussion of the political decision taken by the 
State of Bavaria) a public figure; the spreading the image beyond the limited public 
domain composed of mainly teachers, school children and (possibly) their parents to 
potentially millions of television viewers was regarded as a severe infringement of the 
personality rights of the plaintiff; see BGH NJW 1985, 1617 ff. 
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and exclusive right to determine freely the extent to which their pri- 
vate matters can be made public.123 Accordingly, consent to a first 
publication cannot automatically be deemed to imply acceptance of a 
new dissemination.124 Prior tolerance to publicity will only diminish 
the level of damages available.125 In France, claims against revela- 
tion of material already in the public domain have failed not because 
plaintiffs are categorised as absolute public figures but because they 
have consented to publicity and are denied the possibility of with- 
drawing their approval.126 Nevertheless, this traditional case-law 
has been criticised on the ground that celebrities may waive their 
right to privacy to satisfy fickle changes of mind or to suit financial 
strategies. Thus, in more recent cases, a more flexible approach 
seems to be emerging, balancing privacy with freedom of expression 
in a way which looks similar to the German approach.127 
A related question that has arisen in both jurisdictions is where 
the event reported was once very much in the public domain but sub- 
sequently became forgotten. Can it be revived, at the risk for instance 
of disturbing the rehabilitation of the claimant? The decision of the 
German Constitutional Court of 5 June 1973,128 as well as the subse- 
quent decision of the Court of Appeal of Hamburg of 5 February 
1978,129 With facts (and outcome) very similar to those of the decision 
of the California Supreme Court in Melvin v. Reid'30 contain guiding 
principles which could prove useful to our courts.'31 In the criminal 
context, in Germany the right to publish images of convicted 
criminals gradually recedes while the right to make a fresh start 
takes pre-eminence. The public trial is the place where individuals 
123. See Civ. 2"me 14 November 1975, D. 1976, p.421, note B. Edelman. 
124. See C.A. Paris 19 June 1998, D. 1998, I.R., 204. 
125. See C.A. Paris 28 February 1989, JCP.1989.II.21325, note E. Agostini. 
126. See T.G.I. Paris 8 September 1999, D.2000, Somm. com., p.271, obs. C. Caron. 
127. See at first instance level, T.G.I. Paris 8 September 1999, op. cit.; T.G.I. 
Nanterre 3 March 1999, Legipresse, 1999, no162-I, p.75; T.G.I. Paris 4 February 1988, 
JCP.1988.II.21107, note E. Agostini. See as well at Cour d'appel level, C.A. Toulouse 
10 December 2002, JCP.2002.I.126, note E. Tricoire. See also Civ. 1ire 10 October 
1995, JCP. 1997.II.22765, note J. Ravanas: the widow of the former Emperor of China 
was not entitled to complain about a book written by one of his biographers after his 
death, mentioning facts that the Emperor had himself, in an autobiography published 
earlier, confessed. (As an heir, the widow would not today be allowed to complain 
about infringements of the deceased's privacy anyway - see below). 
128. BVerfGE 35, 202 = NJW 1973, 1227. 
129. OLG Hamburg, AP 3 (1976), 137 and note Gehard. 
130. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). 
131. Other cases outside the criminal context can be mentioned, e.g., the decision 
of the Landgericht Berlin concerning the TV anchorman discussed above. The court 
decided in favour of the plaintiff because his past - with the relevant events taking 
place some 20 years previously - had already been the subject of public discussion two 
years before the trial and the public interest in renewed (and unnecessarily sensa- 
tionalist) coverage thus ranked below the right of the anchorman to make a fresh 
start. 
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must take responsibility for their actions, after which they eventually 
regain the right not to be exposed publicly.132 
In contrast, the existence of a "right to be forgotten" (droit a 
l'oubli) is doubtful in French law. Most cases consider that a person 
cannot prohibit a new publication of facts relating to an old criminal 
affair which had attracted public odium.133 This case-law is criticised 
on the grounds that where the person is no longer in the limelight, 
such repetition impairs the chances of reintegration in society. 
To conclude, in French and German law we again see the evolu- 
tion of (occasionally varying) nuanced, context-specific approaches to 
the publication of material already in the public domain, with clear 
guidelines established by (especially German) courts as to how free 
expression and privacy are to be balanced in such cases. Thus far, 
however, the guidance available in English decisions is again scant 
and unsatisfactory.134 The reliance on incremental expansion of the 
breach of confidence action has, once again, served (if anything) to 
blur the picture. In the absence of clear judicial dicta and the estab- 
lishment of a privacy action with a firm basis in principle, a long and 
tortuous process of case-law driven evolution, with consequential 
costs to plaintiffs and publishers, is thus to be expected. In all likeli- 
hood, this will only lead to costs and delays though, ultimately, our 
courts are likely to reach a result broadly similar to that currently 
taken by the German courts. Should blinkered objection towards 
comparative European law thus be allowed to prevent our judges 
from taking early advantage of the European experiences? 
Though we argue for open-mindedness, we also are quick to 
stress that we are not suggesting a slavish adoption of foreign law. It 
132. As a striking example we refer to the decision of the OLG Hamburg concern- 
ing the publication of photos of Marianne Bachmeier, a woman who had killed the 
murderer of her child in the courtroom. The court distinguished between, on the one 
hand, images taken of her at the time of the event and the subsequent trials and, on 
the other hand, pictures taken after her sentence was beyond appeal. Publication of 
former was allowed inter alia due to the fact that she had consented to the making of 
two films about the event and had thus willingly entered the public stage; publication 
of the latter were prohibited for the sake of rehabilitation. OLG Hamburg AfP 1987, 
518 (Marianne Bachmeier). Witnesses may be regarded as relative figures of public 
attention, as can - under exceptional circumstances - the victims themselves (e.g., if 
there is a special personal relationship between offender and victim). Members of the 
offender's family will usually not be regarded as relative figures of public attention; 
see OLG Frankfurt GRUR 1958, 508, 509. 
133. Civ. 1ire 20 November 1990, JCP.1992.II.21908. 
134. The decision in Bell did concern the restraint of publication of new material 
rather than the resurrection of old material previously in the public domain. How- 
ever, Butler-Sloss P. was anxious to emphasise that it would be "wrong for the court 
to find that the notoriety which may follow the commission of serious offences would 
of itself entitle the offender upon release from prison to injunctions based upon the 
interference to his private and family life caused by press intrusion." Op cit., para. 59. 
This would appear again to tilt the balance presumptively towards free expression 
rather than towards ensuring that individuals have the space to complete their reha- 
bilitation. The Court of Appeal avoided engaging with this issue in Ellis. 
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thus appears to us that previous publication will continue to be a 
very relevant factor in deciding whether to grant relief, perhaps to a 
greater extent than in German law - but not a determining factor. 
However, in the absence of a clear judicial steer, the principles under- 
pinning the breach of confidence action can provide little or no con- 
ceptual guidance. Only an approach based on privacy rather than 
confidence can make coherent sense. When Lord Hoffmann in Wain- 
wright argues that privacy as an "underlying value" of the common 
law is nevertheless not "capable of definition to enable one to deduce 
specific rules", he disregards without discussion the German, French 
and US experiences of privacy as a general principle providing ex- 
actly the required coherent guidance to frame and shape the common 
law in practice. 
e) Citation of authority 
Discussing judicial directions as to the citation of authority may 
appear an unusual topic to insert at this stage, but the guidance that 
has been given in this respect in the post-HRA cases is significant 
and illustrative as to what it demonstrates again of the weaknesses 
of the existing confidence-based incremental approach of the English 
courts. Early in his judgment in A v. B, Lord Woolf included in his 
guidelines the following admonition:'35 
"In the present appeals the parties have placed before us three 
lever arch files of authorities. In addition, during the course of the 
hearing we were handed a number of other domestic and Strasbourg 
decisions.. .It is understandable that, in what is a developing area of 
the law, citation of authority is necessary, but we would hope that the 
law has now, at least at the level below the House of Lords, become 
sufficiently clear to make the citation of authority on this scale un- 
necessary.. .The need for control of the extensive citation of authority 
should be born in mind in deciding questions of costs since it leads to 
disproportionate expense which can in turn make litigation beyond 
the means of ordinary persons. . .The authorities largely fell into two 
categories. The first. . .consists of the decisions of the Strasbourg 
court on Articles 8 and 10. These decisions are valuable sources of 
principles which the articles embrace. The decisions do however tend 
to repeat the same principles in successive cases in order to apply 
them to different situations. The citation of a single authority may 
therefore be all that is required." 
Though this statement seems particularly apposite to applica- 
tions for injunctive relief made to judges in their chambers - usually 
late in the evening - where speed rather than thoroughness is de 
rigueur, it contains quite a remarkable series of propositions which 
135. Op cit., paras. 8-9. 
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must, for the sake of proper evaluation, be scrutinised with great 
care. Five objections can thus be levelled against it. 
First, the idea that the three "lever arch files" account for the 
cost of litigation in England is, with respect, unconvincing. High legal 
fees, the use of two sets of lawyers (solicitors and barristers) for the 
work done in other systems by one, the length of oral argument, and 
the considerable expense associated with expert evidence (especially 
before the recent reforms of English civil procedure overseen by Lord 
Woolf himself) are, it is submitted, the most significant contributory 
factors to this unwelcome phenomenon. 
Secondly, the view that these expenses are the reason which 
keeps the "ordinary person" out of court must also be questioned. To 
be sure, our legal system is not available to all who deserve to have 
recourse to it; and in this area, in the absence of legal aid, this means 
that not only those who are very poor are excluded but also those 
with middle incomes. To put it differently, only the very rich can af- 
ford to litigate; and the spate of recent cases confirms this unhappy 
state of affairs. That a change should be made, and made urgently, 
can be strongly argued; that the status quo is due to the "three lever 
arch files" is, with respect, fanciful. 
Thirdly, the somewhat summary rejection of the Strasbourg case 
law as consisting of the repetition of basic principles is surprising to 
say the least. It is also, to use the colloquial expression, like the pot 
calling the kettle black! For thousands of law students (and practi- 
tioners) can testify to the fact that they have been forced to read the 
same long extracts from the same core cases multiple times, due to 
the willingness of the English judiciary to cite the same basic extracts 
repeatedly, even where basic principles are settled and well in place. 
Impressed by this repetitiveness, one of us even tried to do an empiri- 
cal study of how much longer English judgments were getting as a 
result of this long-winded and unnecessary repletion of earlier dicta, 
where no textual or legal point was going to be made by the judge.'36 
Closer attention to how the Strasbourg court has actually applied the 
core principles of its privacy case-law may prove illuminating, and 
our judges need to be prepared to wade through the reiteration of 
basic principles in its case-law to absorb how Strasbourg balances 
and applies these principles in each specific context. 
Fourthly, as the extracts from the German cases show, the prin- 
ciples developed by the German courts - Lord Woolf failed to inform 
us whether any of these decisions were included in the "lever files" - 
are carefully crafted, fact-sensitive, and (at the Federal Court level) 
136. Basil Markesinis and S Deakin, The Random Element of their Lordship's In- 
fallible Judgment: An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Tort of Negligence 
from Anns to Murphy 55 MOD. L. REV. (1992) 619, especially 642-3. 
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hardly repetitive.137 Indeed, precisely because they are so nuanced 
and fact-oriented they are of real use to common lawyers. 
Finally, if Lord Woolfs advice is heeded, future judges will be 
pushed more towards arguing round factual permutations than dis- 
covering, elaborating and applying the correct principles. And if this 
were seen to be an academic's point of view, oblivious of real practice, 
here is what an experienced judge (who is also a respected jurist) had 
to say about the precise issue in question:138 
"What matters, as it always does, is that practitioners should 
help the courts not to try to reason from factual analogies - a process 
once memorably demonstrated by Sir George Jessel139 to be capable 
of eventually standing a decision on its head - but to tease out the 
principles to be applied to ever-new facts." 
It appears to us that attempting to sidestep the issues of princi- 
ple at stake in privacy issues in favour of an excessively fact-specific 
approach will engender more litigation in the absence of accessible 
broad guidelines based on sound and accessible principles. It also ig- 
nores the reality that core questions of privacy and the protection of 
human personality are at stake, and we are confident that any at- 
tempt to retreat within the walls of an old-fashioned pragmatic, fact- 
specific approach will prove ultimately more problematic than a bold 
attempt to formulate the key principles that should apply. Again, the 
incremental, pragmatic approach to protecting privacy via the fig-leaf 
of confidence is distorting and obscuring the need for a principle-led 
approach. Wishful hankering for a factual approach that does not 
bother with issues of principle or foreign comparative material is 
likely to ensure greater confusion, a longer and more tortuous process 
of developing the law (perhaps necessitating frequent prodding from 
Strasbourg), and greater costs for litigants and the courts in the long 
run. 
f) Remedies: damages and injunctions. 
Given the absence of a tort of privacy it is not surprising to assert 
that there is a considerable dearth of authority and guidance on the 
question of damages. The rules applicable to breach of confidence can 
provide some guidelines; in our view so can foreign law, with the lat- 
ter having the advantage of long familiarity with the issues thrown 
up by the application of privacy laws and a coherent principled basis. 
With the latter mainly in mind we thus note three points. 
137. The repetition of principles does, however feature in the decisions of the Con- 
stitutional Court, which also often have the un-welcome feature of being exceedingly 
long. 
138. Sir Stephen Sedley, Foreword to PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA. THE DEVELOPING 
LAW (London: Matrix Media and Information Group, 2002). 
139. In Aspden v. Seddon (1875) 10 Ch. App. 394, 397, n. 1. 
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(i) Damages for mental distress, injury to feelings and the like. 
This is the non-pecuniary element of the award that would become 
payable if a tort were to be recognised. Back in 1993, Lord Mackay's 
Report140 expressed the view that they could be modelled on awards 
made for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, wrongful arrest 
and other such torts. They also believed that if that were the case, the 
average levels would be somewhere in the region of £2-5,000. In 1997 
the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg awarded14l what, in to- 
day's values, would be approximately £10,000. In the same year the 
same court142 awarded roughly the same amount to a claimant who 
complained for wrongful telephone tapping which, inter alia, caused 
stress. English cases have moved in the same region143 and, more 
intriguingly (proving, once again, the transplantability of foreign law 
based on similar values and value judgments), so have the German 
courts.l44 71Vhat some jurisprudes sometimes refer to as statistical 
reasoning thus offers reassuring data that the development of pri- 
vacy law in this respect is on the right track. 
The position in France points in the same direction though two 
caveats must be stressed. 
The first is associated with the (often) excessive variations in 
awards - often regional in character - found in French (and Italian) 
compensation law. Thus, we find judgments awarding 1F (lOp) for a 
photograph taken in a churchl45, 150 OOOF (£15,000) for the use of 
telephoto lens to take a picture in a private place of a celebrity in her 
swimming costume146, 50 OOOF (£5,000) for the photograph of a pub- 
lic figure known for her elegance as she was bedridden147, 250 OOOF 
(£25,000) for the photograph of an actress in the nude.l48 
The second caveat is associated with wider, 'structural', differ- 
ence between French law on the one hand and English and American 
law on the other. Two in particular are relevant here. The first is the 
absence in French law of punitive damages and the second is related 
to the fact that in French law there seems to be no clear distinction 
140. Infringement of Privacy, Consultation Paper, July 1993. 
141. In Z v. Finland [1997] 25 EHRR 371. 
142. Halford v. United Kingdom [1997] 24 EHRR 523. 
143. Cornelius v.De Taranto [2001] EMLR 329. 
144. For which see full details in Markesinis and Unberath, and the case law given 
by Damm/Rehbock, WIDERRUF, UNTERLASSUNG UND SCHADENSERSATZ IN PRESSE UND 
RUNDFUNK (2nd ed. 2001), pp. 351-371. Compensation in money (only available for 
serious infringements of personality rights anyway) usually ranges from £200-15,000; 
and even the exceptional award of around £60,000 in HansOLG Hamburg NJVV 1996, 
2870 only reached this level due to the fact that it was granted for a total of three 
(separate) infringements of Princess Caroline's privacy rights - publication of 1) a 
freely invented interview, 2) a photo allegedly taken from the family album and 3) an 
incorrect marriage announcement. 
145. C.A. Paris 11 February 1987, G.P.11-12 March 1987, p. 18. 
146. C.A. Paris 12 May 1986, D.1986, I.R., 445. 
147. T.G.I. 30 June 1984, D. 1985, I.R., 15. 
148. C.A. Paris 4 January 1988, D.1989, Somm. com., p. 92, obs. D. Amson. 
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between the right of publicity as distinct to privacy. Thus, first, when 
the circumstances of the case show gross and recurrent infringe- 
ments of the claimant's privacy or high profits for the defendant, 
French judges tend to depart from a purely compensatory approach 
and (unexpectedly) increase the level of damages. Secondly, the ab- 
sence of clear distinction between a right of publicity and a right of 
privacy may also help explain why there seems to be a correlation of 
higher awards and publicity claims and lower awards and invasion of 
privacy complaints. 
(ii) Economic losses. In addition to the above, the intrusion into 
one's private life may entail economic onsequences. Here, depending 
on the nature of the intrusion and whether one is talking of true pri- 
vacy cases or tort of publicity cases (which, in our view, are the Doug- 
las cases), the measure of damages could be different, i.e. 
compensatory or restitutionary (taking the form of an account of prof- 
its). This distinction is important not only in order to determine the 
test of remoteness of damage but also in order to decide on the possi- 
bility of exemplary damages under what is clearly a developing law of 
exemplary damages. After Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicester- 
shire Constabulary,l49 exemplary damages should be possible against 
public off1cials as well as rapacious media defendants exploiting the 
plight of others for gain. But Lord Nicholls' opinion in that case im- 
plies further developments which might allow exemplary damages to 
be awarded whenever the defendant's conduct amounted to "an out- 
rageous disregard of the plaintiffs rights". This could prove most ap- 
propriate in cases of non-commercial breach of conf1dence or 'true' 
privacy violations where the 'non-economic' damages would, as stated 
above, be likely to be modest. By making it difficult for the media to 
evade or ride roughshod over the developing privacy law by reason of 
being likely to have to pay the aggrieved claimant a nominal sum 
only, it would thus act as a suitable deterrent to outrageous and ag- 
gressive journalism for profit. 
On the other hand, excessive damage claims for commercially- 
based publicity cases need to be resisted - infringements upon a per- 
son's control of their personal image should not be equated with gross 
intrusions upon personal privacy, and this needs to be well estab- 
lished in judicial guidance from the higher courts. The very moderate 
damages awarded to Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones fol- 
lowing the success of their confidence claim ((£14,600 was awarded, 
with the plaintiffs initially claiming a much larger sum) indicates 
that the English courts are willing and able to recognise this distinc- 
tion.150 The question of who actually suffers from a publicity right 
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infringement should be crucial - in the case of Douglas and Zeta- 
Jones, it is at least arguable that the majority of any loss incurred 
was by OK! magazine, whose exclusive on the wedding was ruined by 
the publication by Hello magazine of the photos obtained in breach of 
confidence, and the pecuniary loss suffered should not in any circum- 
stances be conflated with the damages linked to the alleged distress 
caused by the intrusion on the couple's wedding. The award of 
£1,033,156 to OK by the English courts in contrast to the much lower 
sum awarded to Douglas and Zeta-Jones reflects this approach, and 
shows a welcome sensitivity to the relative nature of the harm in- 
curred by the different plaintiffs. 
This point has already been raised in Germany, where the Fed- 
eral Constitutional Court stated that 
"there is no protection of the private sphere against public atten- 
tion if a person has agreed to the publication of particular matters 
which are usually regarded as private, for example by entering into 
exclusive contracts concerning press coverage of events taking place 
in the private sphere. The constitutional protection of the private 
sphere on the basis of Articles 2(1) and 1(1) of the Basic Law is not 
granted in the interest of commercialising the own person. No one is 
restricted from permitting access to the private sphere, but a person 
cannot at the same time invoke the protection of this sphere against 
public attention. The expectation that the public will not (or only to a 
limited extent) take notice of matters or activities emanating from a 
sphere which secures individual private life must be expressed con- 
sistently and without exceptions.''l6l 
This approach introduces a distinction between the protection of 
the right to exploit one's own publicity and personality rights. Ap- 
plied to a Douglas v Hello setting, the latter could still be infringed 
due to the distress caused by the intrusion itself, the subsequent pub- 
lication of material in a category of journal or newspaper very differ- 
ent from the one chosen by the victim (e.g. in the German context, 
Bild instead of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) and the way the 
material is presented by the intruder. Damages will, however, not 
reflect the commercial value of the exclusivity agreement rendered 
ineffective by the intrusion unless the victims were under a contrac- 
tual obligation to secure this exclusivity and thus suffer a commercial 
loss due to the breakdown of the agreement. But this would have to 
be argued under a different heading altogether. 
(iii) Inheritability. But just as important is another point which, 
again, has been considered by German law. 'True' privacy cases in- 
volve personality violations and thus claims arising under them 
should come to an end with the death of the aggrieved claimant. This 
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is the established position in Germany, where courts and academics 
focus on the main function of compensation for pain and suffering 
(Schmerzensgeld), which is to provide satisfaction for the victim 
(Genugtuung). Though deterrence is also part and parcel of these 
claims (especially in the case of gross infringements by the Press, 
e.g., invented interviews or manipulated images), claims for 
Schmerzensgeld due to infringements of the right to privacy are thus 
of a highly personal nature and end with the death of the victim.152 
As clarified by the Federal Supreme Court in its Marlene Dietrich 
decision of 1999, tort of publicity claims, on the other hand, resemble 
more proprietory rights and thus may be inheritable:153 
"The elements of financial value in the right of Marlene Dietrich 
to her own picture and name have passed to the claimant as sole heir. 
This is because, regardless of their transferability between living per- 
sons, these elements are - in contrast to the highly personal elements 
which protect non-material interests - inheritable. Insofar as the 
rights of personality protect non-material interests, they are indissol- 
ubly bound to the individual and, as highly personal rights, cannot be 
renounced or taken away and are, therefore, neither transferable nor 
inheritable. . . . It is true that, according to constant case law, the 
continuing image of the personality is also protected after death 
against serious distortions. Likewise, the right to one's own picture 
and possibly also the right to a name continue to have an effect be- 
yond death. But, on a posthumous violation of these rights, only de- 
fensive claims are granted to the person entitled to exercise them, 
and not claims to compensation for harm, because a deceased person 
could not suffer harm which is compensatable by a money pay- 
ment 
.... 
The defensive claims granted are of little use, however, if 
the violation of the right - as is frequently the case - has already 
ended before the person entitled to the claim obtains knowledge of it. 
Besides this, it seems unfair to surrender the financial value created 
by the achievements of the deceased and embodied in his picture, his 
name or his other personality features after his death to the clutches 
of just any third party, instead of giving this financial value to his 
heirs or relations or other persons who were close to him when he 
was alive."154 
152. For details see, e.g., Damm/Rehbock, WIDERRUF, UNTERLASSUNG UND 
SCHADENSERSATZ IN PRESSE UND RUNDFUNK (2nd ed. 2001), pp. 340-342. 
153. BGH 1 December 1999, BGH 1 ZR 49/97 (engl. translation) on Basil 
Markesinis' Website of German and French Legal Materials at University College 
London/University of Texas at Austin, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/globallaw. In fa- 
vour of the introduction of a right of publicity in French law, see G. Loiseau, "Des 
droits patrimoniaux de la personnalit6 en droit frangais" (1997) McGill Law Journal, 
319. 
154. In the same decision, the BGH points out that heirs may exercise these rights 
only in accordance with the presumed wishes of the deceased and only for a limited 
period of time. 
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This position of German law again reflects the dichotomy be- 
tween 'true' privacy issues and (commercial) publicity interests al- 
ready highlighted above. 
In France, the Jean Gabin case law,155 by which privacy rights 
were recognised as inheritable from deceased persons, has been 
overruled. 156 
Given the varying consequences that could therefore flow from 
the distinction between non-commercial 'true' privacy and publicity 
cases (and which are well-established in German law and not un- 
known, though blurred, in French law), appropriate guidance via ju- 
dicial dicta should be directed to establishing and clarifying the 
position in UK law. Such distinctions have yet to be made in the law 
of confidence, again due to its initial origins and concerns being far 
distant from the privacy context, even if the level of damages in pri- 
vacy cases appears to be converging with the ECHR and German 
standards. At present, as all privacy violations come under the com- 
mon rubric of breach of confidentiality, there is a real danger that the 
different forms of privacy intrusion involved - whether 'true' privacy 
claims or commercial publicity claims - and the quanta awarded for 
each would be confused. 
g) Deciding criteria for protection - privacy v. confidentiality 
The most important and as yet not finally resolved question con- 
cerns the choice to be made in approach between a privacy-centred 
approach versus one that retains its umbilical cord link to confidence. 
The expanded protection for privacy interests that has been described 
in this article has come to be linked to an expanded notion of confi- 
dence, in particular since the decision of the House of Lords in Wain- 
wright that English law does not know of a tort of privacy per se. All 
this, however, has come at a price. 
155. See Crim. 21 October 1980, D. 1981, p. 172, note J. Lindon. 
156. Civ. 1ire 14 December 1999, Mitterand, JCP.2000.II.241, Conclusions C. Petit. 
But pictures of dead bodies must still meet the requirements of human dignity: the 
photo taken and published of M. le Prefet Claude Erignac, as he was lying dead in a 
street of Corsica, after being murdered, was held to be contrary to human dignity. See 
Civ. 1pre 20 December 2000, D.2001, p. 872, note J.-P. Gridel. The fact that M. Er- 
ignac's face was perfectly recognisable seemed to have been decisive in the Cour de 
cassation's decision. The Erignac case thus confirms - though freedom of expression 
did not prevail - that privacy rights do not survive the aggrieved person's death. In- 
deed, in this case it was agreed by all parties, even by the applicants, that the de- 
ceased's privacy rights were not at stake. The Cour d'appel (C.A. Paris 24 February 
1998, D. 1998, p. 225, note B. Beignier) still relied on the concept of privacy, but held 
that the aggrieved person was not the murdered Prefet but his relatives, hurt during 
their time of mourning. This reasoning still held to a survival of privacy rights, albeit 
indirectly (via the hurt relatives) and temporarily (during the days of mourning). The 
Cour de cassation upheld the ruling against the journalists but on the ground of 
human dignity. After death, only human dignity can therefore restrict freedom of ex- 
pression. Privacy rights can no longer be invoked. 
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The price has been much ingenuity being spent on whether a 
duty of confidence has been imposed (i.e. has material that should 
remain confidential been published) rather than on the nature of the 
information revealed (i.e. has material whose publication would seri- 
ously infringe upon personal privacy been published, with the identi- 
ties of those involved being more relevant at the justification stage). 
This has produced confusion and a fundamental lack of clarity, en- 
couraged an emphasis upon the persons and circumstances involved 
rather than upon the material in question, and ensured that the 
scope of the expanded breach of confidence action is uncertain. So in 
Douglas the focus was on whether the taking of photos in the particu- 
lar circumstances of the wedding in question breached a duty of confi- 
dence, with much detailed consideration of the particular conditions 
attached to the wedding invitations and little guidance being pro- 
vided for future courts and litigants. A better approach, it is submit- 
ted, would have simply been to consider whether publication of the 
images in question violated the right to personal privacy of the plain- 
tiffs, taking into account the agreed commercial publication of other 
images from the same wedding. 
The Court of Appeal decisions in Campbell and A v. B plc were 
commendably more concerned with the nature of the information in 
question and the justifications in each case for publication. However, 
while the decisions in each case may be entirely supportable, by con- 
fining their approach to the rubric of confidentiality both decisions 
left lower courts with little or no guidance for dealing with future 
privacy cases that involve material already in the public domain, an 
area that would appear to lie well outside the cope of a breach of con- 
fidence action as traditionally understood but which is central to pri- 
vacy issues, as demonstrated by Peck and Ellis. 
Notwithstanding these objections, the argument is however 
made (or more usually, implied) that privacy is an insufficiently pre- 
cise concept around which to frame a tortious remedy, and that 
breach of confidence offers a more precise, well-established and doc- 
trinally sound foundation for developing remedies for intrusive inva- 
sions of privacy.157 But is it convincing? Here are some of the most- 
frequently cited grounds on which the equitable remedy of confidence 
is based on: 
- The jurisdiction in confidence ". .. is based not so much on 
property or on contract as on a duty to be of good faith"158 or "on the 
moral principles of loyalty and fair dealing."'59 
157. See R. Wacks, 'The Poverty of "Privacy"' (1980) 96 Law Quarterly Review 73. 
158. Fraser v. Evans [1969] 1 QB 349 CA at p. 361 per Lord Denning M.R. 
159. A.G. v. Guardian Newspaper (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, at p. 269 per Lord 
Griffiths. 
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- "Like most heads of exclusive equitable jurisdiction, its rational 
basis ... lies in the notion of an obligation of conscience arising from 
the circumstances".160 
Well-settled and uncontroversial though these points are, we 
submit they do not provide the basis of a predictable and principled 
extension of the law to the area of privacy in general. The two Doug- 
las cases, in our view, particularly support this contention; and if we 
are right in this we further submit that going through the notion of 
breach of confidence will not provide the law - academics and practi- 
tioners - with greater clarity than going through the notion of pri- 
vacy. The reasons we make this assertion are the following: 
Firstly, the opaqueness of the breach of confidence remedy when 
used to perform the functions of privacy became apparent in the two 
Douglas cases. For when the Court of Appeal denied the grant of an 
interim injunction restraining the initial publication of the photo- 
graphs by Hello, at least two judges in Douglas No. 1 - Brooke and 
Sedley'6' - seemed to assume that the breach of confidence approach 
would not protect the claimants if it were shown (which it had not 
been done at that stage of the proceedings) that the unauthorised pic- 
tures were taken by an intruder and not a guest who had accepted to 
come to the wedding subject to the conditions attached to the invita- 
tions. This assumption appears to have been based upon the under- 
standing that a breach of commercial confidence could only arise out 
of a pre-existing confidential relationship. That is why Lord Justice 
Sedley proceeded to make the "most instructive"'62 observations he 
made about privacy, presumably since this part of the judgment 
would determine the outcome had the pictures been taken by 
"intruders". 
Yet there is no word of that obstacle in Douglas No. 2 when the 
case was returned to the High Court for a decision on its merits, 
where Lindsay J. seemed to have extended the existing remedy to 
cover this eventuality. He did this because he felt he could treat the 
claimant's case as either being akin to the commercial confidence 
cases or being based on a "hybrid kind" of right, whereby "by reason 
of it having become a commodity, elements that would otherwise 
have been merely private became commercial".163 The intruding pho- 
tographer in question and the defendant publishers were held to have 
known (or ought to have known) that the wedding images had the 
quality of confidentiality. As was previously established in respect of 
160. Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Phillip Morris Ltd. (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414 at 
437-8, approved by Bingham L.J. (as he then was) in A.G. v Guardian Newspapers 
(No 2) CA, [1990] 1 AC 215-6. 
161. Op. cit., at paras. 59 and 112 of the respective judgments. 
162. The way Lord Woolf L.C.J. described Sedley L.J.'s judgment in Wainwright, 
op cit., para. 2. 
163. Op cit., para. 49. 
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information of a private nature, publication of this "hybrid" confiden- 
tial material was thus held by Lindsay J. to be a breach of confidence 
even in the absence of a pre-existing relationship that was presumed 
to be necessary in Douglas No. 1.164 
The word "hybrid" could be taken as indicating that the learned 
judge was, himself, aware of the novelty of his solution; and it cer- 
tainly leaves one wondering why, if confidence could have provided 
the answer, Brooke and Sedley L.J.s did not think of this point. It 
clearly shows the malleability and opaque nature of the breach of 
confidence remedy, and the lack of predictability as to how it will be 
applied and expanded. The extent to which this new twist on the law 
will alter the way the right to control one's own image for commercial 
purposes is applied is unclear. The basic principles of "good faith" and 
"obligation of conscience" that underpin the breach of confidence ac- 
tion do little to provide conceptual clarification or a sound principled 
basis when image rights are at stake, and as argued above, this lack 
of clarity has potentially considerable consequences for the award of 
damages. 
As it currently stands, it is also uncertain (as discussed above) 
whether the confidence action is capable of providing the protection 
for privacy that the UK is obliged to provide as a consequence of Peck, 
and whether and to what extent material already in the public do- 
main can be protected. Lindsay J.'s previously cited comments in 
Douglas No. 2 that the judiciary may have to move beyond the law of 
confidence to establishing a privacy action if Parliament does not act 
reflect the concern and uncertainty generated by the inability of the 
law of confidence to give a clear principled steer in such cases. If 
breach of confidence is now to be extended to cover the publication of 
164. Lindsay J. cites Megarry J. (as he was then) in Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) 
Ltd [1969] RPC 41: 
"It seems to me that if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man 
standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised 
that upon reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in con- 
fidence, then this should suffice to impose upon him the equitable obligation 
of confidence." 
Lindsay J. considered that within that description are cases in which a third party 
defendant has received information with notice that he received it by way of a breach 
of confidence by the confidant to whom it was given and includes also cases where 
that third party has deliberately closed his eyes to the obvious, citing in support of 
this Lord Goff in A-G. v. Guardian Newspaper (No 2) [1990] 1 A.C. 109, at 281, as well 
as Lord Griffiths in the same case at 268 and 272. However, Brooke LJ had referred 
also to Lord Goff's comments in the Guardian case, and appeared to consider that 
they would not apply to an uninvited intruder (see Douglas No. 1, paras 58 and 59). 
Lindsay J. also expressed the view that even if he was incorrect in recognising this 
"hybrid" category that he would have been prepared to treat publication as a breach of 
confidence on the grounds that the wedding images could be considered confidential 
private material, and that the subsequent fact of their publication did not alter the 
private nature of the images (see para. 50). 
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such material,165 then what will be protected is intimate information 
of a private nature, not "confidential material" as traditionally classi- 
fied. Breach of confidence will only suffice as a remedy capable of sat- 
isfying the ECHR requirements if the scope of the action is extended 
beyond "confidential" information to protect against unjustified in- 
trusions upon privacy in general, including material that may techni- 
cally be within the public domain, and the "confidential" tag given to 
the material protected by the action becomes a mere terminological 
fig-leaf.166 
If this happens (and the approach taken by Butler-Sloss P. in 
Venables and Bell, as well as the Court of Appeal in A v. B and Camp- 
bell seems to be going down this road), then breach of confidence will 
have essentially mutated into a form of privacy action."' However, 
the vestigial categories left over from breach of confidence have the 
potential to keep on causing persistent confusion and conceptual lack 
of clarity, as Douglas illustrates. The development of this new rem- 
edy will in the absence of a coherent principled basis rooted in the 
recognition of the right to personal privacy rely on gradual and incre- 
mental evolution via long-drawn out litigation, imposing costs on liti- 
gants and publishers alike. The effect of this will be in all likelihood 
to deter less well-off complainants, in turn reinforcing the impression 
that privacy litigation is simply the province of pampered 
celebrities.s68 
We would also emphasise that the principles of good faith and 
obligation of conscience underpinning breach of confidence are not ca- 
pable of providing a strong foundation for the development of a pri- 
vacy action capable of meeting the ECHR requirements. They provide 
little or no guidance where what is at stake is intrusion into personal 
privacy where no imputation of bad faith in the traditional equitable 
sense on the part of the publisher is involved. The initial use and 
dissemination of the footage in Peck was done in apparent ignorance 
of the true circumstances of the case, and so no 'bad faith' in the con- 
ventional sense was involved. It is worth noting as a demonstration of 
our concern that the original purpose and role of the confidence ac- 
tion is so removed from its current task of protecting privacy that 
breach of confidence was not argued or discussed by the Court of Ap- 
peal in Kaye, despite the wide ranging nature of the arguments in 
that case. 
165. The Strasbourg court in Peck considered that at the time of the complaint 
(1995), the law of confidence did not provide a remedy. 
166. See R. Singh and J. Strachan, "Privacy Postponed?" (2003) EHRLR Special 
Issue: Privacy 2003 12, 24. 
167. Lord Woolf in A v. B plc appeared to suggest that breach of confidence could 
extend to cover "an intrusion in a situation where a person can reasonably expect his 
privacy to be respected": see A v. B plc, op cit., para. 11 (x). 
168. See R. Singh and J. Strachan, op cit., 19. 
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Confidence also offers no guidance or obvious relief where an in- 
trusion into privacy does not result in a publication as such.169 The 
breach of confidence action is solely concerned with restraining publi- 
cation. An intrusion into personal privacy similar to that in the Wain- 
wright case or where photojournalists intrude into personal privacy 
but their pictures are not actually used is beyond the scope of the 
confidence action. Buxton L.J. made this clear in Wainwright, noting 
that Douglas and other confidence cases "do nothing to assist the cru- 
cial move now urged, that the courts in giving relief should step 
outside the limits imposed by a requirement of a relationship of confi- 
dence, artificial or otherwise."'70 This is a serious gap, that lacks any 
justification in principle: serious intrusions in privacy should be ca- 
pable of giving rise to a legal remedy, irrespective of whether that 
intrusion has resulted in publication or not. 
It is therefore our opinion that far from providing a stable foun- 
dation for the development of privacy remedies, breach of confidence 
offers a less than coherent framework. In the wake of Douglas, A v. B 
plc, Venables, and Campbell, the breach of confidence remedy is mu- 
tating at an exponential rate, being used as it is to fill gaps in the law 
that arise from the lack of a coherent privacy action. The remedy has 
now been stretched a sizeable distance from its original role of pro- 
tecting the integrity of pre-existing confidential relationships. How- 
ever, the requirement that any such private information be capable of 
being shoehorned into the category of 'confidential' to satisfy the re- 
quirements of the confidence action will in all likelihood continue to 
produce conceptual difficulties and gaps in protection.171 
It would be more intellectually honest, as well as doctrinally 
more satisfying, if the emergence of a distinct law of privacy on firm 
principled foundations from the chrysalis of the law of confidence 
were to be recognised and developed by our courts. It is now apparent 
in the wake of Peck that for the action to be sufficiently stretched to 
meet the requirements of the ECHR while retaining coherence, the 
principles underlying the remedy need to be recognised as rooted in 
privacy rather than confidence. The Strasbourg court in PG and JH 
v. UK referred to Article 8 of the ECHR as protecting a "right to iden- 
tity and personal developments and the right to establish and de- 
velop relationships with other human beings and the outside 
world".172 If the UK courts are to ensure that this fundamental as- 
pect of human personality is adequately protected in the common 
law, then judicial courage is needed to recognise the existence of a 
tort of privacy emerging from the needlessly tortured evolution of the 
169. See J. Morgan, op cit., 457. 
170. [2001] EWCA Civ 2081, para. 99. 
171. See R. Bagshaw, Obstacles on the Path to Privacy Torts, in P.B.H. Birks (ed.) 
PRIVACY AND LOYALTY (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997); J. Morgan, op cit., 468-473. 
172. (2000) EHRR 1016, para. 56. 
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breach of confidence action. Wainwright as a decision can be seen as 
singularly lacking in courage. 
We are reinforced in this view by the following bold and, we sub- 
mit, helpful admission found in the judgment of the Master of the 
Rolls in Campbell v. MGN Ltd (CA) where the learned Lord said:173 
"The development of the law of confidentiality since the Human 
Rights Act 1998 came into force has seen information described as 
"confidential" not where it has been confided by one person to an- 
other, but where it relates to an aspect of an individual's private life 
which he does not choose to make public. We consider that the unjus- 
tifiable publication of such information would be better described as 
breach of privacy rather than breach of confidence." 
This is both conceptually and terminologically accurate, and ulti- 
mately more honest. What is now necessary is judicial boldness to 
translate this terminological shift into a fully-fledged privacy action 
based on a solid formulation of clear principles. The Indiana Appel- 
late Court in Continental Optical Co. v. Reed174 seems to us to have 
come up with a workable formula to define a privacy violation which 
is no vaguer than the ones used to base the notion of confidentiality 
while also being closer to the heart of the matter. The court defined 
actionable violation of privacy as: 
"the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personal- 
ity, the publicising of one's private affairs with which the public has 
no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private ac- 
tivities, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, 
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities." 
The statement has received the approval of one of England's 
most experienced (former) judges'75 who is widely acknowledged as 
an expert in this area of the law and is repeated here by us in the 
hope that it may be used as the basis of a new and more meaningful 
elaboration of our developing law of privacy. 
5. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CREATION OF A GENERAL TORT 
OF PRIVACY 
What we propose here is of course not a novel idea. However, the 
idea of establishing a general tort of privacy has continually met with 
judicial and political disapproval. It therefore is germane to ask why 
is the development of such a right resisted so fiercely. Those who fear 
the creation of a tort of privacy express their anxieties either by using 
evocative language - e.g., the "blockbuster" tort - or by ominously 
alluding to other factors which, however, they then fail to take head 
173. [2003] 2 WLR 80, para. 70. 
174. 14 ALR 2d 743 (1949). 
175. See Sir Brian Neill, Privacy: A Challenge for the Next Century in PROTECTING 
PRIVACY 4 (Basil Markesinis ed., Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 4. 
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on and explore in the light of day. So here we have assembled some of 
these fears, gleaned from newspaper cuttings, papers from the Press 
Complaints Commission or even judicial utterances - official or ex- 
tra-judicial. Most 'privacy observers' will recognise them instantly, so 
it will serve no purpose to attribute them specifically to individuals or 
organisations. 
a) The recognition of a general tort of privacy will impede 
investigative journalism. 
The former Chairman of the Press Complaints Commission, Lord 
Wakeham, made this point strongly on many occasions. Thus, in a 
lecture delivered on 23rd January 2002 he argued that: 
"a privacy law would provide a severe blow to the ability of news- 
papers to investigate, scrutinise, and - where necessary - intrude in 
the public interest. The freedom of the Press, which has been a cen- 
tral plank of Britain's democracy since 1689, would be seriously 
eroded." 
One wonders how many fall for this doomsday-day scenario with 
its emotional appeal to the birth of civil liberties in modern Britain. 
One hopes, very few. For, firstly, the vast majority of the privacy 
cases in both the UK and aboard are not concerned with fundamental 
media freedoms but rather with incidental and intrusive news pieces. 
Secondly, neither the defences provided by the UK Press's own Code 
of Practice or anything the courts of this country or any other have 
said or done would inhibit politically related intrusions (e.g., the 
Guardian's pursuit of the Aitken affair) but only restrict offensive in- 
trusions, revelations, or disclosures which had as their main aim to 
increase the revenues of the publishing medium. The public interest 
remains in every jurisdiction a defence of very wide scope. Thirdly, a 
rich case law from common law and civil law jurisdictions proves the 
correctness of the assertion that investigative journalism will be able 
to avail fully of such a defence and operate untrammelled. Thus, in 
German law, a system possessing a developed law of privacy, freedom 
of expression and freedom of the press176 are seen as core elements of 
the constitutional framework and valued as absolutely fundamental 
("schlechthin konstituierend") for a democratic society. To be sure, 
human dignity is an over-arching notion in German consitutional 
law. Nonetheless, German constitutional theory does not accept the 
notion of a hierarchy of protected rights and thus accords constitu- 
tional protection to both 'serious' journalism and the tabloid press 
with its focus on entertainment.'77 
176. Both protected by Article 5 of the German Constitution. 
177. BVerfGE 35, 202 (223) (Lebach). 
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Even in French law, where privacy has historically been en- 
dowed with a very high value,l78 freedom of expression is nowadays 
seen as a constitutional value,l79 and has been so long before privacy 
was expressly consecrated as another fundamental right by the Con- 
seil constitutionnel.l80 Both privacy and freedom of expression there- 
fore benefit from constitutional standing in the hierarchy of norms. 
Consequently, neither the judiciary nor the legislature can intervene 
in these fields, except to increase protection guarantees or to ensure 
that the exercise of these rights is compatible with other constitu- 
tional rights and principles. French judges cannot therefore simply 
sacrifice freedom of expression and investigative journalism to the 
benefit of privacy rights. A harmonious coexistence between those 
two often conflicting interests must be found and privacy will not sys- 
tematically prevail; and the French courts are laying increasing em- 
phasis upon this principle, especially where investigative journalism 
and exposure of corruption is concerned.l8l 
In practice therefore investigative journalism attracts particular 
attention on the Continent when in conflict with other basic rights, 
and the number of senior German and French politicians who have 
seen their careers destroyed by such journalistic work attests to this 
conclusion. 
b) A general right of privacy would greatly restrict freedom of 
expression 
The previous objection is often phrased in a different manner, 
the argument being made that a privacy tort would not alone restrict 
investigative journalism but also free comment and expression in 
general. This is an argument one often finds in that part of the Press 
which opposes the introduction of a tort of privacy. The reality is very 
different. A privacy tort is entirely reconcilable with strong respect 
for freedom of expression, as evidenced in particular by the approach 
178. The importance of pr*acy in French law appears in the particular treatment 
it attracts in tort law: unlike other torts, where the plaintiff must prove that his al- 
leged harm originates from the defendant's faulty or negligent behaviour, violation of 
privacy rights in itself justifies remedies (See Article 9, paragraph 2 of the Civil 
Code). 
179. The Conseil constitutionnel in its decision << Entreprises de presse >>, on 10-11 
October 1984 declared that freedom of expression was a fundamental principle, and 
the source of other rights and liberties. See, Favoreu-Philip, Les grandes decisions du 
Conseil constitutionnel, Sirey, 1999, n°36 p. 599. 
180. The right of privacy was only explicitly conferred with constitutional value on 
23 July 1999, in the Conseil constitutionnel's decision << Couverture maladie univer- 
selle >>, as part of individual freedom recognised by Article 2 of the 1789 Declaration. 
See, D.2000, Somm. com., p. 422, obs. L. Gay & M. Fatin-Rouge,. 
181. See Civ. 2ame 24 January 1996, Bull. civ., n°9, holding that "the revelation that 
a maire was unduly receiving redundancy benefits after having wrongly registered as 
unemployed did not violate the maire's right to privacy ". See also Cour de cassation, 
Civ. lere 23 April 2003, D.2003, n°28, p. 1854, note C. Bigot. 
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of the German courts. Because of lack of space we thus reproduce below only a small selection of statements from some key German decisions to illustrate this and add that these are not just words. It is also worth emphasising that in many of these cases, defendants who in our system would be found guilty of defamation have been ab- solved from all liability precisely because the German courts have taken the view that freedom of expression is an important right which often trumps reputation and privacy. In France, it is arguably true to say that considerable emphasis is placed upon the protection of privacy interests. However, as previ- ously discussed, judges aim to balance privacy with freedom of ex- pression: each alleged privacy infringement is considered within its particular context, and the balance between privacy and the crucial constitutional value of free expression is struck on the basis of flexi- ble general guidelines broadly similar if less structured than the cate- gories utilised in the German case-law.l82 Also, it is again worth noting that the mildness of privacy-related sanctions compared to the level of damages granted in English courts in cases of defamation is revealing of the proportionality French judges strive to ensure be- tween privacy rights on the one hand and the interests of free speech on the other.183 
Thus, in cases where speech clashes with privacy we find the German courts - but also to some extent the French courts - weigh- ing such factors as: (i) the motives of the publisher184 which, in the context of privacy protection, has been taken to mean that if the inva- sion was motivated by a wish to make money at the expense of the plaintiff, damages should be assessed in a way that would deprive the tortfeasor of his ill-gotten gains (so-called 
''Gewinnabschopfung);185 
182. Article 9 of the Civil Code reflects a duality between the right to privacy, which is recognised in the first paragraph, and the right to intimacy to which the sanctions stated in the second paragraph only apply. However, judges do not usually refer to the restrictive precision in paragraph two. See lately, Civ. lbre 12 December 2000, D.2000, p. 2434, note J.-C. Saint-Pau. The restriction stems from the 17 July 1970 Act which introduced a right to privacy into the Civil Code. Thanks to this more restrictive concept of intimacy, the legislature purported to reach a compromise be- tween privacy and freedom of expression. See M. Pleven, JOAN, session of 27 May 1970, p. 1987. Journalists were thus ensured that coercive measures would be con- fined to the limited number of cases where the core of privacy (the intimate sphere) had been interfered with. However, instead of refining on the definition of concepts like privacy and intimacy, French judges have preferred to maintain a balancing ap- proach between privacy and freedom of expression, and have done without precise and abstract definitions. Even when the infringement affects the plaintiff's intimate sphere, freedom of expression may prevail and vice versa. 183. For example, see C.A. Paris 3 March 2000, n°2000108537 and 30 May 2001, n°2001/03705. See also C.A. Paris 31 May 2000, n°2000104335. 184. Contrast BVerfGE 7, 198 (Luth) with BVerfGE 25 256 (Blinkfuer). 185. See, for instance, BGH 19 September 1961, BGHi 35, 363, 369 ff and, more recently and in a more elaborated manner, BGH 15 November 1994, BGHZ 128, 14- 16. This introduction of"punitive" damages into German law has generated much (and not always favourable) comment from academic commentators. See, for instance, 
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(ii) the importance of the speech in question (e.g., does it advance 
knowledge and public debate or merely benefit the speaker finan- 
ciallyl86); (iii) the way in which the information about the plaintiff 
was obtained: by illegal means,l87 telephoto lensl88 (indicating to the 
'intruder' that the plaintiff wished to be left alone); (iv) the extent of 
the dissemination of the information;l89 (v) the accuracy of the state- 
ment or whether it was fabricated by a news medium;l90 (vi) the 
breadth of the restriction which the plaintiff wishes to place on the 
defendant's speech rights;l9l (vii) other, wider societal objectives 
Stoll, Haftungsfolgen im burgerlichen Recht (1993), 57-67; 79-82; 210 ff.; Rosen- 
garten, "Der Praventionsgedanke im Zivilrecht" NJW 1996, 1935-1938. In France, the 
Cour de cassation when approving preference being given to privacy over freedom of 
expression often underlines in these instances the lack of informative substantive 
content of the speech act in question and the publisher's solely commercial motive. 
See Civ. 2eme 12 July 1966, D.1967, p. 181; Civ. lere 18 May 1972, J.C.P. 1972.II.17209. 
The publisher's purely financial motive may then be one of the factors justifying more 
coercive remedies such as seizure. The award of punitive damages, based on the de- 
fendant's profits, is however not accepted in France. The traditional, albeit changing, 
absence of any right of personal publicity, coupled with the non proprietary interest 
vested in the "true" personal right of privacy precludes such a punishment. See on 
this point, C.A. Paris 31 May 2000, n°2000/04335: "the award of damages in a claim 
relating to privacy should not have a deterrent or punishing function on the Press. Its 
aim is to compensate the harm suffered by the plaintiff >>. Many authors and judges 
would however welcome the introduction of punitive damages in French Law: see B. 
Beignier, "Reflexions ur la protection de la vie privee", Droit de la famille, November 
1997, n°11, p. 4; see also C.A. Versailles 23 September 1999, CCE 2000, n°25. 
186. BVerfGE 7, 198, 219 (Luth). See also the decision of the Cour de cassation, 
Civ. lere 25 January 2000, D.2000, Somm. com., p. 270, obs. C. Caron 
JCP.2000.II.10257, Conclusions Jerry Sainte-Rose, holding that the newsworthiness 
of an image prevails over the image right of an individual who happens to appear in 
the photo of an important topical event, without being the main subject of the photo. 
187. BVerfGE 66, 116 (1984) (Bild-Wallraff). Also, in France, see T.G.I. Paris 1 
April 1997, Legipresse, 1998, n°151-I, p. 52 (where a hidden camera was used). 
188. BGH 19 December 1995, BGHZ 131, 332. The overall damages for Princess 
Caroline's harassment were fixed at 180,000 DM: Court of Appeal of Hamburg, 25 
July 1996, NJW 1996, 2870. French courts take the same view, see T.G.I. Paris 29 
May 1996, Legipresse, 1996, n°135-I, p. 122. However, a photograph taken through 
telephoto lens will not automatically be held illegal and contrary to privacy rights: see 
C.A. Versailles 16 January 1998, D.1999, Somm. com., p. 166, obs. C. Bigot. 
189. BVerfGE 35, 202 (Lebach) OLG Saarbrucken NJW 1997, 1376, 1379. In 
France, limited dissemination will rarely stop judges from holding that a pr*acy 
right has been interfered with, but the extent of the dissemination will be taken into 
account at the remedy stage. See Civ. lbre 31 January 1989, Bull. civ., n°949, where 
the Cour d'appel was reproached for having extended the effects of a seizure order of 
intrusive material to the whole of the French territory, instead of limiting its ambit to 
the area where the potential victims were all residing. 
190. See: BVerfSE 34 269 (1973) (Soraya); BVerfGE 54, 208 (1980) (Boll); BGHZ 
128, 1 (first Caroline Case). In France, it is well established that journalists cannot 
avail themselves of freedom of expression if their statements seriously distort reality, 
cf. T.G.I. Paris 17 avril 1996, Legipresse, 1996, n°134-I, p. 105. 
191. BVerfGE 42, 143 (1976). In contrast, this factor has no real bearing on French 
judges' reasoning as, under Article 9, §2 of the Civil Code, judges have discretion to 
choose the most appropriate remedies, as long as the measures chosen are less strin- 
gent than the one sought by the plaintiff and that the two parties are given opportu- 
nity to exchange their arguments (see Dalloz action, Droit et pratique de la procedure 
civile, 2002-2003, n°3275). 
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which may be involved in the dispute,l92 and (viii) the conduct of the 
plaintiff.l93 The German courts also take the view that a severe at- 
tack may justify an otherwise excessive counter-attack (the 
Gegenschlag theory of speech).l94 In this way, freedom of expression 
is given due weight in a balancing exercise that gives appropriate 
recognition and protection to all forms of socially valuable free 
speech. 
It is important o add and emphasise the fact that the identifica- 
tion of these factors has, over the decades, led to a nuanced approach 
in the protection of privacy under German law. A number of gradated 
levels of protection have been developed, including in ascending order 
of protection the public sphere (Offentlichkeitssphare), the social 
sphere (Sozialsphare), the private sphere (Privatsphare), the confi- 
dential sphere (Geheimsphare) and the intimate sphere (Intim- 
sphare) of human life. These gradations may be seen as Germanic 
(too Germanic by some) in their attempt to achieve doctrinal accuracy 
and perfection. Nonetheless, the basic idea behind them is emerging 
in English law; and it also has the added bonus of showing how - in 
the absence of a hierarchy of rights - two conflicting positions such as 
privacy and freedom of expression can, if at all possible, be brought o 
a harmonious co-existence and both accorded the largest possible 
amount of protection. These categories in German law should also be 
seen as an attempt to establish broad guidelines for the resolution of 
concrete conflicts and to that extent they are helpful even if not nec- 
essarily transplantable. 
The five categories can roughly be outlined and delineated as fol- 
lows (bearing in mind that the real difficulty comes in the application 
of the facts of each case under the 'right' heading): 
192. BVerfGE 35, 202 (1973) tLebach). See also, the Cour de cassation, Crim. 15 
November 2000, Procedures, 2001, n°497, p. 26: protection of public order may war- 
rant intrusions upon people's privacy. 
193. BGH 5 May 1964, NJA7V 1964, 1471 offers a good example of the position taken 
by German courts that not everything that interests the public can be published in 
the public interest but that the conduct of the plaintiff may have a bearing on whether 
relief is given. In that case, the defendant magazine wrote an article about a criminal 
prosecution brought against the plaintiff. In it, it also referred to his repeatedly adul- 
terous life. The court stressed that, normally, such revelations will be treated as 
amounting to actionable instances of violated privacy. In this case, however, the reve- 
lation was left unpunished since the plaintiff had, in the past, held himself out as a 
moralist. In France as well, the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Paris has pointed to 
the plaintifFs behaviour to refuse remedy for his violated privacy right. On 3 Decem- 
ber 1997 (J.C.P.1998.II.10067), the Tribunal refused to grant compensation to the 
plaintiff - the manager of Voici newspaper - because he had expressed himself pub- 
licly as being in favour of press intrusions on people's privacy. This decision, although 
satisfying on moral grounds, contradicts the principle that mere violation of privacy is 
actionable under Article 9, §2 of the Civil Code without proof of any damage. 
194. BVerfUE 12, 113 (1961) (Schmid-Spiegel), re-confirmed by BVerfGE 54, 129 
(1980) (art critic). 
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(i) The public sphere, which includes freely observable activities. 
Individuals who seek publicity must accept potential interest in and 
discussion of their behaviour. This does not exclude prieracy rights 
altogether, though, and German courts will always focus on the par- 
ticular circumstances of a case in order to strike a balance between 
privacy and freedom of expression.l95 French judges will similarly 
pay attention to the public context of the case put to them,l96 albeit 
without any prior formal characterization of the facts into the public 
sphere. 
(ii) Social sphere. This covers everyday participation in social 
life. Without attracting any particular publicity, individuals working, 
attending public events, walking down streets, eating in restaurants 
or shopping, move in public by their own free will and must, in princi- 
ple, accept coverage of this activity by the Press.l97 Weddings and 
divorces are equally regarded as social events, and individual protec- 
tion will be limited to the requirement that any coverage must be 
truthful. In contrast, there is no recognition of a social sphere as such 
in French law. Rather, the relevant question is whether the social 
event aims at fulfilling a private or a public purpose.l98 
(iii) Private sphere. This sphere concerns areas which are not ac- 
cessible without consent of the individual. This applies to family rela- 
tionships and activities conducted in the private household setting, 
and there is, in principle, no distinction between celebrities and 'nor- 
mal' individuals. Here, in France even more than in Germany, the 
protection of privacy will carry stronger weight than in the two 
spheres mentioned previously, but the special interest of society in 
195. Thus, while the publication of photos showing Princess Caroline of Monaco 
and her future husband Prince Ernst August of Hanover kissing on the fringes of a 
dressage tournament was regarded as permissible by the Landgericht Hamburg (un- 
published decision by OLG Hamburg 11 August 1997, 324 O 554/97), privacy took 
pre-eminence in the case of photos showing a nude sunbather in a public garden (OLG 
Munchen NJW 1988, 915) and a drunken construction worker on an openly visible 
worksite (OLG Frankfurt NJA7V 1987, 1087). 
196. See C.A. Versailles 27 June 2002, Legipresse, 2002-I, n°110: "the borders of 
Article 9 of the Civil Code shift where Princes are involved". See also Civ. lere 23 April 
2003, C. Bigot, Dalloz, 2003, n°28, p. 1854, where the statement announcing Prince 
Karim Aga Khan's divorce was held to be capable for further dissemination as relat- 
ing to an official event. 
197. BVerfGE NJW 2000, 1021 (Princess Caroline of Monaco). 
198. In principle, French judges consider that Press coverage of public exhibitions 
or public everyday life cannot be paralysed by privacy or image rights (see C.A. Paris 
12 May 1995, D.1997, Somm. com., p. 719, obs. J.-Y. Dupeux). But the privatepurpose 
of an event, whether familial (for a wedding see T.G.I. Paris 2 March 1989, G.P.5-6 
June 1989; C.A. Paris 6 October 1999, D.2000, Somm. com., p. 267, obs. A. Lepage), 
religious or other (for participation in a gay rights demonstration see C.A. Versailles 
31 January 2002, D.2003, n°23, Somm. com., p. 1533, obs. C. Caron), may take prece- 
dence over the right to report on the event in particular circumstances. Under French 
law, it is thought that the publicity characterizing such social activities should not go 
beyond the limits of the publicity that the affected person wishes to confer upon these 
essentially private events. 
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individuals who are a part of public life will again affect the balanc- 
ing exercise and this can outweigh privacy rights.'99 
(iv) Confidential sphere. The confidential sphere covers material 
which is clearly not meant to reach the public. This includes confiden- 
tial thoughts and ideas committed to paper,200 audio material201 and 
highly personal data.202 In this area, freedom of expression will yet 
again not be restricted in each and every case, but there is a very 
strong bias in favour of privacy. 
(v) Finally, the intimate sphere is the only area where privacy 
will usually rule supreme. Fortified by the constitutional notion of 
human dignity, which requires that every individual must be allowed 
a sphere of life which may not in any way be penetrated by others, 
this covers, e.g., written and audio-visual material especially related 
to sexuality, medical information, and information confided to 
priests, doctors or legal representatives. The level of protection will 
thereby increase as it becomes more intimate.203 Even so, German 
law provides (as in the other, less protected spheres) that previous 
activities of the person involved can in turn undermine even this high 
level of protection. Thus, a celebrity's voluntary participation in por- 
199. Factors to be taken into account include the importance of the information, 
the previous behaviour of the person involved (e.g., a search for publicity; the 'open- 
ing' of the own private sphere for commercial purposes; the continued public expres- 
sion of strong moral views by a politician), and his/ her position as a permanent public 
figure or even someone who attracts public attention only for a limited period of time. 
This again shows that the balancing exercise conducted by German courts is flexible, 
always performed on the basis of the individual facts of a case, and that the potential 
for exposure of hypocritical behaviour by politicians or moral leaders is adequately 
protected. In this context, two further points are of interest. In BGH NJW 1999, 2893 
(the Prince August of Hannover adultery case), the Bundesgerichtshof stressed that 
Article 5 of the Basic Law also covers publications focusing merely on entertainment 
and/ or sensationalist coverage. This clearly strengthens the position of the tabloid 
press, as evidenced by the commercial strength and prominence of Bild! A different, 
slightly earlier decision, potentially widened the area belonging to the private sphere. 
Here, photos showing Princess Caroline of Monaco in a secluded garden restaurant 
were taken from a great distance and with the help of long-lens cameras. Both the 
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Constitutional Court accepted that these pic- 
tures, though taken outside the private premises of the plaintiff, constituted an in- 
fringement of the right to privacy because the individual had chosen discreet 
surroundings and had obviously intended to be left alone on that particular occasion. 
All this goes to underline our earlier point that the actual facts of each case ultimately 
reign supreme, something with which no common lawyer would feel inclined to 
challenge. 
200. E.g., letters, diaries or the internal memorandum of a lawyer. 
201. E.g., telephone conversations recorded contrary to criminal law. 
202. E.g., the so-called 'genetic fingerprint' of a human being. 
203. Under French criminal law, intrusions into the intimate sphere by means of 
certain specific devices (Article 226-1 of the Criminal code), revelations of the infor- 
mation obtained as a result (Article 226-2) and the setting up and sale of the said 
devices (Article 226-3) are severely punished. Interference with the intimate sphere 
thus allows criminal proceedings whereas infringements of privacy generally speak- 
ing only give rise to damages or coercive measures. 
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nographic films will shift the balance towards freedom of expression 
where the publication of otherwise intimate images is at stake.204 
Overall, and despite admitted difficulties of classification at the 
fringes of each category, we submit that these criteria are not only 
more rational than our own attempts to stretch medieval torts to 
modern situations not envisaged when these torts became part of our 
legal scene. We further submit that these criteria are all transplant- 
able into our own system and, indeed, this may be beginning to hap- 
pen already, albeit under other headings such as breach of 
confidence. We also submit that in light of the German experience in 
particular, there is no reason to fear that a law of privacy would im- 
pact negatively upon the vital role of freedom of expression in public 
debate, the scrutiny of public figures and fair comment in general. In 
actuality, the restraints in English law on freedom of expression im- 
posed by its excessively rigid defamation laws constitute a far greater 
potential impediment than a law of privacy ever would.205 
c) Our knowledge of comparative European civil law is very 
limited and we cannot thus use it either as a guide or even 
as a source of inspiration and ideas 
Of course, judges and academic lawyers in the UK are broadly 
aware of some of the comparative experience discussed here, even if 
they have a distorted and partial picture, or even if such experience is 
ignored, as in Wainwright. Nevertheless, there has been a great re- 
luctance to see the commonsensical positions developed in the Ger- 
man and French contexts as capable of providing any real guidance 
for the UK. This is often based upon the lazy assumption that 'foreign 
law' is inaccessible, alien and non-transplantable and so therefore it 
204. Though courts have taken into account in favour of individuals mitigating fac- 
tors such as the length of time since the last 'cinematic' engagement and previous 
disclosure of this intimate personal history. See Landgericht Berlin 19 November 
1996, NJW 1997, 1155 where the participation of the applicant in pornographic films 
dated back some 20 years and had already been the subject of extensive public discus- 
sion before the respondent yet again (years later) reported on this topic in an unduly 
sensationalist way. The applicant had by then established himself as a TV 
anchorman, distanced himself from his participation in the production of porno- 
graphic material, and overcome the family crisis triggered by the previous revela- 
tions. In France, even the first revelation of the applicant's pornographic past would 
probably have been held to violate his right to privacy, on the ground that voluntary 
participation in pornographic films does not entail consent to publicity beyond the 
films' audience, especially when the piece of information relates to such an intimate 
sphere. This analysis of the plaintiffs expectations and implied consent thus inhibits 
to some extent a true confrontation between privacy and freedom of expression. This 
position - derived from the << personal > nature attached to the right of privacy - is 
however gradually changing, through the influence of comparative law and the 
ECHR. 
205. We cannot but feel that one of the reasons for the reluctance to reform our 
defamation law in a sensible and pro-free speech manner is precisely the lack of an 
adequate and principled law of privacy which in turn ensures reluctance on the part 
of politicians to give the Press any quarter in the field of defamation. 
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is impossible to form an adequate picture of how freedom of expres- 
sion and privacy interact in jurisdictions which do in fact extend legal 
protection to privacy. 
This used to be so but is becoming less and less convincing - 
partly because so many of our lawyers are, these days, studying Eu- 
ropean civil law law at foreign universities and partly because the 
amount of material available in English (primary and secondary) has 
increased exponentially in recent years. Increasing academic and ju- 
dicial cross-fertilisation of ideas and the ever-greater development of 
personal and professional points of contact for practitioners have also 
contributed to eroding the knowledge barriers between different 
jurisdictions. 
In addition, the development of cross-border cases means that 
English judges can no longer be oblivious to foreign law. At present, 
whenever the circumstances or consequences of the events which con- 
stitute a tort arise in a foreign country, English judges must refer to 
Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1995 (in force since 1 May 1996). The Act states as a general rule 
that the applicable law is the law of the country in which the events 
constituting the tort or delict in question occur.206 The possibility of 
English judges having to apply a foreign privacy law is therefore far 
from remote. Obviously, like in any private international law cases, 
the application of a foreign rule is subject to the requirements of pub- 
lic policy.207 But, as it has been observed, "there is certainly nothing 
so extreme or objectionable about a foreign law on invasion of privacy 
which would justify not applying it in England".208 How come then 
English judges have remained hostile to a right of privacy, even in 
international cases?209 
The root of this persistent position appears to be the broad exclu- 
sion provided for in Section 13 (1) of Part III of the 1995 Act. Accord- 
ing to Section 13 (1), any defamatory claim - widely defined - falls 
outside the scope of Part III of the 1995 Act. This exclusion covers 
any claims brought in England for libel under English law, for slan- 
der under Northern Ireland law, verbal injury under the law of Scot- 
land, as well as any claims for other malicious falsehood. Besides, 
Section 13 (2) refers to claims under the law of any other country 
corresponding or otherwise in the nature of the above mentioned 
claims. Is it imaginable that an issue, characterised as one of privacy 
under French law for example, be treated as a defamation case, 
under the broad meaning of Section 13? Section 13 would surely ap- 
ply to a derogatory but true statement, published in France, which is 
206. Section 11 (1). 
207. Section 14 (3). 
208. Cheshire and North's Private International Law, 13th ed., Butterworths, p. 
646. 
209. See Lord Lester in Hansard (HL) 27 March 1995, cols 1410-1413. 
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denied the exceptio veritatis under French law because it relates to 
privacy matters.210 As a result, such an issue would be excluded from 
the statutory rules and subjected to the common law rule of double 
actionability.211 Under this rule, the plaintiff will have to overcome a 
double hurdle: he will have to prove that there is actionability both by 
the law of the forum and by the law of the place of the tort, with a 
flexible exception in favour of the law of the country which the issue 
has the most significant relationship with. In practice, this double 
actionability rule allows a defendant to rely when it applies on 
defences available under English law, even though the publication 
was abroad and such a defence is not available under the law of the 
country where the tort was committed. Why favour in such an anom- 
alous way the defendant, i.e. the Press?212 A return to less extreme 
solutions is feasible. Harmonization of private international rules 
may come in the form of a new EC regulation, known as Rome II, 
whose enforcement would be under the ECJ's supervision.213 If the 
regulation is finalised and the U.K. decides to opt in, application of 
foreign laws which recognise privacy rights would become common 
practice. In turn, this may work as an incentive to the introduction of 
a right of privacy in English domestic law. But why waste time; why 
not turn to comparative law spontaneously? 
d) European civil law codal structures make the use of foreign law 
difficult or impossible 
The critics of a comparative approach would however also argue 
that the different legal contexts, in particular the codal structures of 
civil law countries, make any comparisons invidious. The answer to 
this canard is a simple "no", since in all the three major continental 
European systems of Italy, France and Germany, the development of 
the law of privacy has been largely the product of judicial activity 
proceeding from case to case in a manner which is both reminiscent of 
210. Article 35 of the French Press Act of 29 July 1881 - as modified by the Ordon- 
nance of 6 May 1944 - forbids journalists and newspaper editors defending them- 
selves against defamation claims to give evidence that the fact is true when the fact 
encroaches on the plaintiffs privacy. 
211. Phillips v. Eyre (1870 LR 6 QB 1, pp. 28-29), as modified by the House of 
Lords, in Chaplin v. Boys (1971) AL 356 and by the Privy Council, in Red Sea Insur- 
ance Co Ltd v. Bouygues SA (1995) 1 AL 190. 
212. For an explanation, see the vigorous campaign of the Press for the exclusion of 
defamation from the scope of Part III of the Act, House of Lords Paper 36 (1995), 
Memoranda by the Guild of Editors, pp. 79-80; The Times, 19 January 1995, pp. 5, 18- 
19. 
213. Under the proposed text - see (1998) NILR 465; R.C.D.I.P. 1998, p. 802 - pri- 
vacy issues and defamation cases would be governed by the same law, the law of the 
country which the case has the most significant relationship with (Section 3.1). Such a 
law should presumptively be taken to be the law of the country where the damage has 
taken place or threatens to take place and that country is presumed to be the country 
where the plaintiff was habitually resident at the time of the wrong (Section 4 a). 
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the common law method but also makes the result transplantable 
into our own system.214 Indeed, as one sees our law developing in 
recent times and compares these developments with, say, what has 
been said and done in Germany during the last thirty to forty years, 
one is struck by a feeling of deja vu. The German case law has in 
particular made use of proportionality tests to balance free expres- 
sion and privacy considerations in a manner that will be entirely fa- 
miliar to British lawyers who have but even a passing acquaintance 
with the case-law of the ECHR and now of the UK courts in applying 
the Human Rights Act. 
e) Different social and legal weight is given to the importance of 
press freedom in other European jurisdictions 
Underlying many of the arguments used to discount comparative 
experience in this area is the assumption that greater value is given 
to the importance of press freedom in UK law and social attitudes 
than in other European countries, and that as a result the UK should 
adopt a very different approach. As noted above, the importance 
given to free expression and to press freedom in the German case law 
acts as an immediate rebuttal to this assumption. Indeed, from a 
German perspective, UK defamation law appears highly restrictive of 
the freedom of speech of the Press. It has been our common experi- 
ence that each European country tends to have a high regard for its 
own degree of press freedom, and a strong suspicion that its Euro- 
pean partners lack a similar degree of concern. Casual assumptions 
of this nature should be treated with suitable scepticism in consider- 
ing the value of comparative approaches to privacy. Lindsey J. in 
Douglas No. 2 understated the case when he put forward the proposi- 
tion: "that other jurisdictions, in general terms no less free or demo- 
cratic than this one, have apparently workable laws of privacy which 
neither oppress nor stifle is at least arguable".215 Our detailed discus- 
sion above of German and French law shows that free expression is 
balanced via a nuanced, proportionality-based approach that will be 
familiar and reassuring to any English lawyer. 
214. The right of privacy in France for example has judicial roots. It stems from 
decisions of the 1950s, holding book or newspaper publishers liable to damages for 
wrongly divulging memories, personal feelings or confidential correspondence, see 
C.A. Paris 16 March 1955, Marl-ne Dietrich, D.1955, p. 295; Civ. 2Xme 12 July 1966, 
Veuve Girard Philippe, D.1967, p. 181; C.A. Paris 15 mai 1970, Jean Ferrat, D.1970, 
p. 466. A right of privacy was finally enshrined into the Civil Code, at Article 9, on 17 
July 1970, after the Cour de cassation, in its yearly report of 1968-1969, had sug- 
gested such a reform. 
215. Op cit., para. 51. 
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f) The Press Complaints Commission (and other regulatory bodies) 
are sufficient to police the Press and other broadcast media 
The argument is also made that while privacy laws may be ap- 
propriate in other jurisdictions, the Press Complaints Commission 
(PCC) is a sufficiently effective self-regulation mechanism for polic- 
ing the Press in this jurisdiction, while regulatory bodies such as 
Ofcom are adequate to supervise the broadcast media. Obviously, the 
development of the law of confidence and the finding of the Stras- 
bourg court in Peck that the PCC complaint mechanism constituted 
an unsatisfactory redress mechanism for the purposes of the ECHR 
has made the much-vaunted self-regulation argument look hollow, 
with Peck effectively putting the final nail in its coffin. 
Nevertheless, a parallel argument is often also advanced that the 
regulatory bodies are sufficient for the vast bulk of privacy cases, and 
that the development of any privacy remedy via the law of confidence 
should be limited in scope and designed merely to supplement regula- 
tion in those exceptional cases where no adequate remedy can be ob- 
tained. The answer to this argument is again "no", for several 
reasons. 
The first set of arguments arise on grounds of justice and partic- 
ularly apply to the Press: it is not desirable to allow the industry to 
decide for itself if it has fallen foul of rules that it has itself helped 
fashion to regulate its conduct. There is no reason why the nemo 
judex in causa sua principle should be disregarded in this context, 
especially when such a fundamental right as personal privacy is at 
stake. 
Secondly, existing regulatory mechanisms are often ineffective 
and lack sufficient powers to uphold privacy rights in an effective 
manner. A finding by the Press Complaints Commission that one of 
its members has fallen foul of the Press Code entails no serious conse- 
quences for the offender and thus no real satisfaction for the victim of 
Press intrusion. Some regulatory bodies concerned with violations of 
human privacy, including the PCC, can only act ex post and not ex 
ante when the need for protection is most needed. This, for instance, 
was the case with the Broadcasting Complaints Commission, which 
was previously the body which deal with matters of fairness, taste 
and decency in broadcasting media (now replaced by the new regula- 
tor, OFCOM). Mr Justice Sedley (as he then was) thought this state 
of affairs was unacceptable as well as in breach of Convention rights 
in R v. Broadcasting Complaints Commission, ex p. Barclay.216 The 
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms, in particular that of 
the Press Complaints Commission, as well as concerns as to its com- 
position and independence, were highlighted in the recent report of 
216. (1997) 9 Admin LR 265. 
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the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Privacy 
and Media Intrusion.217 In Bell, Butler-Sloss P. considered that the 
PCC Code was inadequate to give sufficient protection to Mary Bell 
and her child, citing in particular the ex post facto nature of any rem- 
edies.218 The inadequacy of the PCC's capacity for granting redress 
was demonstrated recently in the Sara Cox litigation, where the lim- 
ited apology issued by the Sunday People in response to the PCC ad- 
judication was so insufficient that Ms. Cox successfully commenced 
legal proceedings.219 Moreover, the decisions of these bodies (such as 
the PCC) cannot be appealed; and it was only very recently (in an- 
other unsatisfactory decision) that the PCC accepted that it was 
"clearly arguable" that its decisions were subject to judicial review.220 
Newspaper editors have recently been very critical of the PCC's rul- 
ings exonerating the News of the World tabloid for its part in the 
collapsed prosecution brought against individuals alleged to have 
prepared a plot to kidnap David Beckham's son, despite the judge in 
the case referring the tabloid to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions.221 
The argument that regulation of the media should be left to spe- 
cialist bodies, and in the case of the Press, to a self-regulatory body, 
remains unconvincing. In the Republic of Ireland, the Legal Advisory 
Group on Defamation, a specialist advisory body, concluded following 
a comprehensive survey of global regulatory practice that while 
"press freedom is fundamental in a democratic society.. .the Group 
was somewhat sceptical as to whether it necessarily follows that any 
statutory intervention would run counter to such desiderata...".222 
217. HC 458-I, Fifth Report 16 June 2003, available at http://www.publica- 
tions.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmcumeds/458/45802.htm (last accessed 
24 June 2003). See also A. Rusbridger, The Guardian (Media Section) 10 March 2003. 
218. Bell, op cit., para. 57. By contrast in France, remedies can - in case of a pre- 
cise and imminent threat of a violation - be obtained ex ante, to avoid the occurrence 
of any damage: C.A. Versailles 2 October 1996, Legipresse, 1996-II, p.146; Civ. 21me 11 
juillet 1985, D. 1986, I.R., 50. 
219. See R. Greenslade, "Sara Cox wins privacy case", The Guardian, 7 June 2003, 
but see the PCC's response to the Sara Cox case for a divergent perspective, published 
on their website http://www.Press Complaints Commission.org.uk 
220. R (Ford) v. Press Complaints Commission [2002] EMLR 95. Even this admis- 
sion had to be "dragged out of the PCC over a period of time (and at a certain cost to 
the litigants) for in an earlier case the concession made was that the point was "at 
least arguable". See R. v. Press Complaints Commission, ex p. Stewart-Brady [1997] 
EMLR 185 (our italics.) 
221. See, e.g., The Guardian, July 2003. Responses to the PCC's adjudication on 
the same day that the Guardian newspaper had breached the Press Code by paying a 
prisoner for an article written on the disgraced peer Jeffrey Archer's spell in prison 
were similarly critical. 
222. Report of the Legal Advisory Group on Defamation, March 2003 (Dublin: De- 
partment of Justice 2003), available at http://www.justice.ie/802569B20047F907/ 
vWeb/flRXHR5NSG5U/$file/report+ofrMhe+legal+advisory+group+ontefamation.pdf (last accessed 26 June 2003). 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Wed, 20 May 2015 19:20:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2004] CONCERNS AND IDEAS ABOUT DEVELOPING ENGLISH LAW 197 
This is not to suggest that regulatory bodies, even self-regulatory 
bodies, cannot play a role if acting as an informal dispute resolution 
mechanism in tandem with a developed law of privacy. The position 
in Germany, where the existence of a self-regulating body was explic- 
itly modelled along the lines of the then British Press Council, shows 
how court intervention can coincide with its own, more informal and 
inexpensive procedures, but its history also demonstrates the inade- 
quacy of a self-regulatory model operating on its own. The Deutscher 
Presserat was created in 1956 in an attempt to avert federal legisla- 
tion regulating the Press, with the German Press (like the contempo- 
rary English Press) being anxious to avoid both statutory regulation 
and a court-created right of privacy. Operating on the basis of two 
documents, a code of practice enunciating principles of sound journal- 
istic practices (publizistische Grundsdtze)223 and a set of rules estab- 
lishing the complaints procedure itself (Beschwerdeordnung), the 
Presserat proved an active but, in terms of remedies, largely ineffec- 
tive body. For the remedies it had (and continues to have) to offer are 
restricted to three options, namely a recommendation (Hinweis), an 
expression of disapproval (Mi/3billigung) and a reprimand (Riage). 
Only the latter will reach the attention of the public due to the obliga- 
tion imposed on the newspaper in question to publish reprimands.224 
Mere recommendations and expressions of disapproval are, in prac- 
tice, restricted to the parties in dispute. Recent statistics show a con- 
stant annual increase of individual complaints from about 400 
instances in 1998 to over 700 instances in 2002.225 
How can the existence (and, apparently, increasing popularity) of 
this self-regulating body be reconciled with the development of Ger- 
man privacy protection by judicial means? First, there are indications 
that applicants seek the assistance of the Presserat (rather than go to 
court) for strategic reasons of their own. Among them is the fact that 
deliberations of the complaints committees are private and confiden- 
tial, and prominent individuals in particular, who seek to defend 
themselves against interferences by the Press, may choose this 
course of action in order to avoid the additional public scrutiny that 
comes with a court hearing.226 
223. First presented to Federal President Gustav Heinemann in December 1973. 
224. See section 16 Pressekodex. The reprimand also appears in the publicised re- 
ports of the Presserat itself. 
225. The number of official hearings leading to a formal decision is, however, far 
lower since as many as 75% of the applications are screened by the Secretary of the 
Presserat, acting in consultation with the chairmen of the complaints committees. 
Complaints for which the Presserat does not feel competent to sit in judgment or 
which are regarded as obviously unfounded are rejected by decision of the Secretary. 
These statistics for the years 1997-2002 are taken from the website of the Presserat, 
see http://www.presserat.de/site/doku/statistlindex.shtml. 
226. This is, for instance, frequently true of politicians who want to 'put their foot 
down' without having any particular need for the legal remedies obtainable through a 
court hearing. We stress this point in the light of the fact that some German politi- 
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This is not the place to speculate on the effectiveness of these 
various strategies; but it is nonetheless interesting to bear them in 
mind in order to realise that in Germany (unlike England) the courts 
and the Presserat are, in practice, viewed as distinctly different fo- 
rums. Apart from being free of cost (a factor which is regarded as less 
important in the light of substantially lower litigation costs in Ger- 
many), the lower profile of the Presserat hearings also has the advan- 
tage of being less risky in complaints with an uncertain outcome. 
Defeat will thus seem less dangerous for the image of a potentially 
unsuccessful applicant. 
Secondly and more importantly, we feel that the remedies offered 
by the courts and the Presserat procedure complement each other 
rather than represent two sets of alternatives. While the plaintiff can 
claim damages, revocation, an injunction or the publication of a cor- 
rective statement in a court of law, remedies offered by the Presserat 
seem to aim at the condemnation of unacceptable journalistic prac- 
tices themselves.227 
This difference is highlighted by the fact that the Presserat may 
(as the PCC can) initiate investigations in its own right, and further 
evidence to support this point can be gleaned from the statistical data 
pertaining to the specific issues raised in the complaints submitted to 
the body. In 2002, section 8 of the Presserat's Code of Conduct (ad- 
dressing the right to privacy and data protection) was invoked in 77 
applications, amounting to a mere 14% of the total number of issues 
raised.228 To the German mind, self-regulation of the Press and judi- 
cial protection of privacy are thus two sides of the same coin rather 
than distinct alternatives. This is underlined by the fact that individ- 
uals who approach the Presserat are not precluded from seeking judi- 
cial remedies. 
cians (e.g., the present Chancellor Gerhard Schroder) have proved more eager to take 
the Press to court than others (e.g., his predecessor Helmut Kohl, who preferred to 
'punish' what he regarded as undue interferences of the Press by shunning certain 
journalists, wherever possible, when they applied for interviews). Yet c-thers, for in- 
stance the former Prime Minister of Northrhine-Westphalia and present Federal Sec- 
retary of Commerce and Labour Wolfgang Clement, known for his tough attitude 
towards members of the Press, has frequently complained to the Presserat, but has 
rarely opted to sue. 
227. To be sure, German court decisions can contain seething remarks on the way 
the rights of individuals were violated by the Press in a given case; but German tort 
law and the statutes regulating the Press (Landespressegesetze) are generally con- 
cerned with compensation rather than the notion of deterrence. The main idea of the 
judicial remedies is thus to restore as far as possible the position of the individual, 
and the wider aim of a Press committed to sound journalistic work only features indi- 
rectly as a reflex of the private-law relationship between the plaintiff and the defen- 
dant. The Presserat, by contrast, seeks to influence the behaviour of its members. 
228. Other matters include the thoroughness of journalistic research (38%), un- 
founded allegations (12.8%), discrimination (8.5%), conflict of interests (6.5%) and the 
unnecessarily violent presentation of material (4.6%). 
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The German experience therefore illustrates that self-regulation 
can work in tandem with a law of privacy, providing all the benefits 
of flexible, low-profile and cheap remedies and procedures that the 
PCC currently provides while the law ensures complainants of the 
possibility of an effective remedy in the case of egregious violations 
that self-regulation cannot redress.229 
g) A general rzght to privacy would open the floodgates of 
litigation 
The possible development of a law of privacy has provoked fears 
of an avalanche of litigation. Similar fears were of course generated 
by the Human Rights Act, and connoisseurs of false legal prophecies 
will be unsurprised that just as those fears proved groundless, for- 
eign experience once again, gives the lie to this assertion in the con- 
text of privacy. Thus, a list of all published decisions by German 
Courts of Appeal and the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) between the 
years 1980 and 2000 reveals a total number of only some 223 privacy- 
related judgments. One could, of course, challenge this figure by say- 
ing that (i) it does not include first instance judgments (which, due to 
their number and subject-matter are often entrusted to specialist 
chambers of the Landgerichte); and (ii) does not include suits that 
229. Judicial remedies are the only remedies available in France but they combine 
both efficiency and rapidity, thanks to an easy recourse to summary proceedings, 
known as "procedure de referes". Article 9, §2, of the Civil Code states that judges 
may, without prejudice to compensation for injury suffered, prescribe all measures 
such as sequestration, seizure and others, appropriate to prevent or terminate an at- 
tack on privacy. The paragraph specifies that these measures may, in urgent cases, be 
prescribed by means of summary proceedings. Initially, the use of summary proceed- 
ings was restricted to violations to the intimate sphere, the core of privacy, and to 
urgent cases. Both restrictions have nowadays disappeared. See Civ. lere 12 December 
2000, D.2001, p. 2434, note J.-C. Saint-Pau. The emergency requirement has been 
bypassed by judges who refer to Article 809, §2, of the New Code of Civil Procedure, 
providing judges with general powers in summary proceedings, irrespect*e of ur- 
gency. The alleged aggrieved or potentially aggrieved person now has to show that 
shehe is faced with a precise and imminent threat of violation. See C.A. Versailles 2 
October 1996, Legipresse, 1996-II, p. 146. Moreover, summary proceedings are only 
supposed to lead to provisional measures. See E. Derieux, "Refere et liberte 
d'expression", JCP. 1997.I.4055; Dalloz Acf;zon, I)roit et pratique de la procedure civile, 
2002-2003, n°1001. But in practice, harsh provisional sanctions, like seizure or prohi- 
bition to publish, may permanently impair the defendant's rights of free speech. 
Aware of this risk, recent decisions seek proportionality between efficient privacy pro- 
tection measures and the restrictions placed on freedom of expression. Thus some 
judges have limited their prohibition to publish to a fixed period of time, within which 
the parties are to start ordinary proceedings. See Civ. lbre 16 July 1997, Bull. civ., 
n°249. Others allow defendants who have had to pay provisional damages to go to 
court in order to establish that the level of the damages in question has turned out to 
be excessiveX See T.G.I. Nanterre 27 January 1999, n°15191198. These restrictions 
ensure that summary proceedings retain their natural purpose - efficiently and rap- 
idly protecting privacy - without permanently affecting rights of publication, at the 
expense of freedom of expression. Thanks to this recent awareness, judicial protection 
offers, for a relatively low cost and without delay, a satisfying balance between pri- 
vacy and freedom of expression. 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Wed, 20 May 2015 19:20:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
230. For comparisons on this see Basil Markesinis, Litigation Mania in England, 
Germany and the United States: Are We so Very Different? (1990) CAMBRIDGE LAW 
JOURNAL 233-276, reprinted as chapter 20 in FOREIGN LAW AND COMPARATIVE METH- 
ODOLOGY: A SUBJECT AND A THESIS (Oxford: Hart, 1997). 
231. Markesinis and Unberath, op. cit., pp. 476-8. 
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were settled out of court. In counter argument, however, one should 
consider the following points: (i) The number of suits that are decided 
by full judgment in Germany is significantly higher (closer to 40% of 
all actions started) than it is in Great Britain (where the figure of 
cases resolved finally by full judgment is closer to 1, 5% to 4% de- 
pending on the kind of claim involved).230 (ii) The number of reasoned 
judgments handed down each year by the German Federal Supreme 
Court is over one thousand or so; compared to this overall figure (and 
the much higher figure of total judgments handed down by the six- 
teen Courts of Appeal), the privacy figure of 223 is very small.231 (iii) 
The costs of litigation in Germany are significantly lower than they 
are in England. Thus, whereas the recent Douglas case was reported 
in the Press to have generated costs of the order of £3-5 million the 
equally important and protracted Caroline litigation in Germany 
generated costs closer to one third of a million German marks - at the 
time approximately £100,000. Even though these figures are neither 
precise nor confirmed, they raise the very legitimate question why 
would privacy litigation in England explode given the costs of litiga- 
tion, the unavailability of legal aid, and the well-known (though ar- 
guably changing) English reluctance to go to court? It should finally 
also be noted that the current celebrity-driven set of breach of confi- 
dence cases have arisen to a large extent precisely because of the in- 
adequacy of existing remedies and the uncertain state of the law and 
the incremental and piecemeal development of the law of confidence. 
Nothing seems to us to generate a flow of litigants and a lack of clar- 
ity for publishers and complainants more than the current stumbling, 
long-drawn out foot-dragging towards the establishment of the pri- 
vacy action. 
h) The constitutional role of the judiciary 
The final objection to the creation of a privacy action in English 
law stems from the concern that any judicial attempt to frame a law 
of privacy would constitute a usurpation of the legislative role of Par- 
liament, especially given the high political profile of this issue. This 
appears to presume that the days of the bold and creative judge re- 
ferred to at the beginning of this paper are over, that any attempt to 
combine existing remedies within a single tortious principle along the 
lines of the seminal case of Donoghue v. Stevenson would in this day 
and age be an excessive exercise of the common law powers and func- 
tions of the courts. This self-imposed reticence is very questionable, 
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being as it is a partial abdication of the role of a common law judge to 
providing coherence and a firm principled basis to the ongoing evolu- 
tion of the common law. It is especially questionable in the privacy 
context, where the fig-leaf of confidence is used to provide a false 
blanket of reassurance to cover over the development of new reme- 
dies.232 Judicial reluctance to grasp the nettle of developing a full pri- 
vacy action runs the risk - as discussed throughout this paper - of 
ensuring that these new remedies develop in an incoherent and un- 
satisfactory manner. 
Thankfully, however, there is now no need to go into constitu- 
tional discussions of the role of the judiciary in developing the com- 
mon law. S. 6 of the Human Rights Act, in requiring the courts to give 
indirect horizontal effect to the contents of the ECHR, places the 
courts under an obligation to develop where necessary the common 
law to give effect inter alia to Article 8 of the Convention with its 
guarantee of privacy as a core element of human autonomy.233 This 
obligation, and the potential implications that it would have for the 
development of a law of privacy, was clearly indicated as a necessary 
consequence of the enactment of the HRA by the Lord Chancellor 
during the Act's passage through Parliament.234 The Peck decision of 
the Strasbourg court has since made it clear that domestic law must 
be capable of protecting this right via some form of legal redress. As a 
consequence, there can be no serious doubt that the English courts 
are under a statutory obligation to develop adequate protection for 
the right to privacy, and the recognition of a freestanding privacy tort 
represents the most honest and effective way of discharging this obli- 
gation. As Morgan has recently said: 
"The current approach of incremental development is at best tim- 
orous, at worst intellectually dishonest, and in practice it means in- 
complete protection, and the most disastrous uncertainty in an area 
of law central both to the "stuff of people's souls" and the freedom of 
the press. In Utopia, Parliament would grasp the nettle and provide a 
232. See J. Morgan, op cit., 470. 
233. The academic literature on the horizontal effect of the HRA and its implica- 
tions for privacy has of course been voluminous. A specimen sample includes the fol- 
lowing: M. Hunt, "The 'Horizontal Effect' of the Human Rights Act" [1998] Public Law 
423; W. Wade, "Horizons of Horizontality" (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 217; I. 
Leigh, "Horizontal Rights, the Human Rights Act and Privacy: Lessons from the Com- 
monwealth" (1999) 48 International Comparative Law Quarterly 57; R. Singh, "Pri- 
vacy and the Media: The Impact of the Human Rights Bill" in B. Markesinis (ed.) 
Protecting Privacy (Oxford: OUP, 1998; G. Philipson, "The Human Rights Act, Hori- 
zontal Effect and the Common Law: a Bang or a Whimper?" (1999) 62 Modern Law 
Review 824; I. Hare, "Vertically Challenged: Private Parties, Privacy and the Human 
Rights Act" [2001] European Human Rights Law Review 526. For a comparative per- 
spective, see B. Markesinis, "Privacy, Freedom of Expression and the Horizontal Ef- 
fect of the Human Rights Act: Lessons from Germany" (1999) Law Quarterly Review 
47. 
234. HL Deb. Nov. 24th, 1997. 
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democratically approved solution, but until that fabulous day the 
best we can hope for is a bold and open engagement with the ques- 
tions by the courts. Distraction from the task by the form and limits 
of a host of ancient actions would be downright harmful."235 
Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright takes an opposite view, arguing 
that the Peck decision is confined to its factual context, and that the 
Strasbourg court is only concerned whether "English law provides an 
adequate remedy in a specific case" where a breach of privacy is at 
stake.236 This disregards the crucial role of the Strasbourg jurispru- 
dence in establishing norms and requirements as to what interests a 
national legal system should protect. It also attempts to ignore the 
reality that, in identifying the absence of adequate legal protection 
for Mr. Peck, the Strasbourg court has identified a systemic failure to 
address privacy issues of which the Peck decision is merely one in- 
stance. Lord Hoffmann also assumed that existing methods of protec- 
tion for privacy interests in English law, including the Human Rights 
Act itself, were sufficient. As we have argued here, this presumption 
is progressively accepted by authors, academics and practitioners 
alike, to be flawed. The development of confidence cannot be viewed 
as discharging the responsibility of the judiciary under the Human 
Rights Act to redress privacy violations. Lord Hoffmann may choose 
to ignore the literature that points out the weaknesses of approach- 
ing these issues through 'confidence.' But its presence is as much a 
fact as is its growing volume so it would be better for the science of 
law if he chose to tell us why it is wrong rather than strive to give the 
impression that the judicial function cannot benefit from academic 
speculation. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The study of foreign law is rarely meant to lead to wholesale 
transplantations of foreign concepts, notions, and solutions but it can 
lead to new ideas infiltrating national law; it may also help dispel 
myths about threatened and imagined consequences in the event of a 
local change in the law. We hope that the preceding discussion has 
furthered both of these aims. More particularly, we note that the rea- 
sons which led the House of Lords to use foreign ideas in their semi- 
nal Fairchild237 decision also exist in this case. The publication of 
news is thus increasingly international; ownership of media is global; 
dissemination of news is rapid and world-wide. In such circum- 
stances, legal diversity is often not a sign of healthy legal pluralism 
but a state of affairs waiting to be exploited by those who have the 
financial means to do so. To conclude this essay we thus wish to sug- 
235. See J. Morgan, op cit., 473. 
236. Op cit., para. 32. 
237. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. [2002] 3 All ER 305 
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gest - in summary form - seven points which deserve further 
consideration. 
First, much change has taken place in our law in recent times; 
and in the topic under discussion, the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act has proved a useful catalyst. This process is bound to con- 
tinue in a linear way, reflecting the growing acceptance of the impor- 
tance of privacy as a fundamental right, and all that the opponents of 
change can and will succeed in doing is to retard its development. In 
this context, we draw our readers' attention to the fact that every 
time a call was made to reform the law, the Press Complaints Com- 
mission (or its predecessor) complained, whinged, objected, fought 
against any idea of change, but, in one way or another, gave in if the 
public pressure was sustained and made incremental concessions. 
We find no evidence of these changes having made our Press less free 
or less wealthy. 
Secondly, the change which is taking place is, in legal terms, still 
timid in so far as it is taking the form of an expansion of one type of 
remedy, that of breach of confidence. We have given our reasons in 
extenso why this way of proceeding, though understandable for lower 
courts, does not offer the best prospects for a principled and workable 
expansion of the law in the future. In our view the incremental devel- 
opment of the law of confidence is an inadequate, flawed, and dishon- 
est way of proceeding with this very important task. The most recent 
academic literature is reflecting this view with increasing force. The 
time has come for our courts to pay attention to these arguments and 
give serious thought for a change in approach. 
Thirdly, we have reached the stage where the recognition of a 
general right of privacy is now, technically speaking, beyond the 
realm of the possible or hypothetical, and could be said to be man- 
dated by the requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR and the obliga- 
tion in the Human Rights Act to give the Convention horizontal effect 
in the development of the common law. Many judges have, as we 
have seen, already prepared the ground for admitting it into our legal 
system. If we are moving in that direction, we submit it is better to 
call a spade a spade rather than have resort to subterfuges that will 
create their own complications. Again, in this piece we have tried to 
point out some of them. 
Fourthly, if the time is ripe for a change, this must be brought 
about by the courts by virtue of the obligations imposed by the 
Human Rights Act given the inertia of the legislature in this context 
(which arguably is - and will remain - paralysed by the pressures its 
members are subjected to by sections of our Press). Those who argue 
that there is no real call or need for a change of current practices are 
indulging in illusion or self-delusion, as demonstrated by the Kaye 
and, more recently, the Peck decisions. The argument, apparently ac- 
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cepted by the House of Lords in Wainwright, that this kind of change 
must be left to the legislator must thus be seen for what it is: unac- 
ceptable obfuscation. The legislature simply shows no sign of acting 
at present. Barely a few months earlier, the Government made it 
clear that it had no intention of legislating on the subject, even when 
it had been asked to do so by a Parliamentary Committee that was 
chaired by a senior Labour figure. Has any government dared to leg- 
islate against the interests of the Press at a time when its popularity 
is waning? Is it likely to happen at a time when the Blair Govern- 
ment seems to be faltering on so many fronts? If there is no action by 
the courts to ensure adequate protection by a suitable route for an 
individual's privacy entitlements under Article 8, then the UK's Con- 
vention requirements will remain unfulfilled. Again, we emphasise 
that the most appropriate and effective route to ensure this protec- 
tion given legislative inertia is to develop a free-standing privacy tort. 
Fifthly all of us accept that no amount of evidence will convince 
those who have an interest not to be convinced. But the record, at 
least, can and should show that the evidence does not support the 
view that political speech, investigative journalism and even idle gos- 
sip will suffer from an enhanced protection of human privacy from 
unjustified intrusions by the Press. 
Sixthly, we express the hope that if new departures are sanc- 
tioned (or at least tolerated) by their lordships, the opportunity will 
also be taken to signal to greedy celebrities that the recognition of 
privacy rights should not be seen as a licence to print money. For 
celebrities, more than others, must be reminded that an equitable le- 
gal system does not allow and will not tolerate those who wish to 
have their cake and eat it - for which, in the present case, read those 
who wish to exploit the Press when it suits them and complain when 
it shows an interest in them which does not conform with their own 
expectations. The law of defamation has, generally speaking, moved 
in this direction during the last ten years or so; and the related law of 
privacy protection should not be allowed to hit troubled waters before 
it settles on an even keel. 
Finally, it would have been desirable if the first case to reach the 
House of Lords under the new regime had the clarity and significance 
of the Kaye facts. Litigation, however, is not as clean-cut and as ac- 
commodating as that. There is thus little doubt that the Wainwright 
case did not provide the ideal set of facts around which to frame a 
coherent law of privacy, because the worst of the invasions was po- 
tentially actionable as a battery. In other words, despite the appel- 
lant's attempt to base their case largely on privacy, there was no 
compelling need for the Law Lords to choose this atypical case to 
make such far-reaching statements about privacy. 
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Notwithstanding the problematic nature of this case, the judg- 
ment of the Law Lords, delivered through the pen of Lord Hoffmann, 
cannot be characterised as anything other than timid, tunnel-vi- 
sioned, insular, and we hope short-lived. The disregard of recent writ- 
ings - by practitioners as well as academics - is notable in the 
judgment of Lord Hoffmann which blithely assumes the adequacy of 
existing remedies in our law. A citation (to an excellent essay by Lord 
Justice Neill) tells us that English law does, indeed, protect privacy 
by having recourse to multiple torts, but this only makes one wonder 
why Lord Hoffmann feels the need to include one on this, so obvious a 
point? 
More regrettably, Lord Hoffmann omits to mention, let alone ad- 
dress, the concerns voiced in the same article by Lord Justice Neill 
about our current law of privacy; fails to imitate him in his declared 
interest in foreign law; and does not cite him for his doubts about the 
wisdom of the Strasbourg judgment in the Spencer case and is only 
willing to follow him in his prediction that the expansion of confiden- 
tiality may hold the answer to the future. But on this point the recent 
doubts of practitioners and academics about the viability of confiden- 
tiality as an adequate remedy for breach of personal privacy are, 
again, ignored. In Lord Hoffmann's world, England thus has nothing 
to learn from France. The same fate is reserved for German law - an 
even more surprising neglect from the President of the Anglo-Ger- 
man Association of Jurists who, one suspects, agreed to chair the So- 
ciety in the belief that we have something to learn from one another. 
Our Canadian relatives are, likewise, ignored - presumably for dar- 
ing to do what Lord Hoffmann regards as impossible! Even American 
law's most daring recent moves to inhibit and penalise the obtaining 
of information through telephoto lens and directional microphones238 
are obscured by the shadow of an old (and famous) article.239 If their 
lordships were not personally aware of such recent developments, 
they could have asked counsel to address them on these points as 
they did in their Fairchild judgments. 
The above is quite an indictment of a decision from the highest 
court of the land. But there is more. Just as worrying is the assump- 
tion in Wainwright that the gradual "judicious development of an ex- 
isting principle" is how the common law works, as opposed to the 
identification of an underlying principle and the shaping of the future 
evolution of the law in line with such a principle. Such an exagger- 
ated embrace of a cautious, pragmatic approach is a remarkable abdi- 
cation of the historic role of the common law courts in shaping and 
giving coherence to the law by the application of core principles. 
238. Cal. Civ. Code s. 1708.8. 
239. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy 4 HARVARD L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
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Analysed in this way, the Wainwright decision makes the English 
common law appear as a very tame creature when compared to its 
more lively Australian or Canadian counterparts. Indeed, it could 
even be seen as a capitulation before lazy assumptions as to the im- 
possibility of defining a tort of privacy, couched in the language of 
pragmatism and deference to Parliament. If this was acceptable 
thirty years ago, it does not seem so now given the clear requirement 
imposed by the Human Rights Act for the courts to give effect in the 
common law to the principles and values explicitly protected in the 
ECHR, including the Article 8 privacy guarantee. Thus, instead of a 
principled approach based upon the recognition of privacy, the Law 
Lords have opted for the timid, obfuscating approach that has repeat- 
edly been proved flawed, lacks clarity, and produces more not less 
litigation. In particular, as we have argued here in extenso, the reli- 
ance upon the law of confidence is likely to prove misguided and inca- 
pable of protecting the private life of individuals from illegitimate 
intrusion. 
And one final observation. If these concluding criticisms appear 
too harshly phrased, it is because we all feel that the science of law is 
not served by excessive deference to judicial authority when it fails to 
perform its work in a transparent, informed, and convincing manner. 
Law Lords can respond with thunderbolts from their heavenly 
heights or, reversely, adopt a state of deafening silence towards their 
critics. But academics must keep reminding their students that the 
members of the House of Lords are not final because they are infalli- 
ble, but infallible because they are final. Indeed, when it comes to 
privacy, the Law Lords are not even final any more: now we have the 
Strasbourg court as the ultimate authority in matters of human 
rights, who will doubtless before long decide that the timidity of the 
English courts is unwarranted and unjustified, as they have so many 
times in the past. 
POSTSCRIPT 
Since the completion of this article, the law of privacy in the UK 
continues to evolve with great rapidity, as the inadequacy of the con- 
fidence action as a remedy requires constant judicial revision to patch 
up its deficiencies. The House of Lords has delivered its long-awaited 
decision in the Campbell case, and by a narrow 3 to 2 majority held 
that the Daily Mirror violated Ms Campbell's privacy rights by its 
publication of photographs of her arrival at a meeting of Narcotics 
Anonymous.240 The approach taken by most of the Law Lords repre- 
sents a significant step in the right direction, but still falls short of 
intellectual and doctrinal clarity and coherence. Campbell repairs 
240. Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL. 
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some of the defects in the evolution of the confidence remedy that 
have been highlighted throughout this article, but the inherent con- 
ceptual limitations of the action remain. 
What is to be particularly welcomed in Campbell is the willing- 
ness of the majority to give a wide ambit to what can be classified as 
"private facts". Lord Hoffmarn in his dissenting judgment still con- 
sidered that photographs taken in a public place would have to reveal 
someone in a situation of "humiliation or severe embarrassment" 
before an infringement of personal privacy is established.241 How- 
ever, the three judges in the majority (all gave separate opinions) in 
contrast considered that information would be protected where a rea- 
sonable expectation of privacy existed on the part of the person con- 
cerned, even in public places.242 Along with Lord Nicholls (in his 
dissenting judgment), the "highly offensive" test propounded by Lord 
Hoffman, the Court of Appeal in A v B and by Gleeson CJ in the Aus- 
tralian High Court in Lenah Game Meats was comprehensively 
sidelined. 
Alongside this welcome expansion of the scope of the protected 
sphere of privacy, the majority were also willing to reject any notion 
of awarding free speech presumptive primacy, to use the language of 
privacy rights rather than the terminology of confidence, and to adopt 
a contextual balancing test similar to, albeit in a diluted form, that 
adopted by the German courts and as argued for in this article. Lady 
Hale was particularly willing to assess the public interest at stake in 
the publication of the photos in question, and to recognise that the 
courts should be prepared to distinguish between different levels of 
justification for publication and to attach a lower value to free speech 
claims where no genuine compelling public interest was at stake.243 
Ms Campbell's status as a public figure was also not considered to 
remove any privacy entitlement she may have: the carte blanche 
given by Lord Woolf in A v B to intrusions upon the privacy of public 
figures and to justifications that equate what sells with the public 
interest has been replaced by the tentative beginnings of the required 
balancing approach. 
These developments are all to be welcomed. However, the con- 
ceptual distortions introduced by reliance upon the confidence action 
framework remain. This can be seen in the dissenting judgments, 
with Lord Nicholls defining protected material as "private informa- 
tion", and Lord Hoffman's emphasis upon the exceptional quality re- 
quired of information obtained in a public place before it could qualify 
for protection. Even the majority judgments are not wholly satisfac- 
tory, with all three steering clear from any citation of relevant and 
241. See para. 75. 
242. See Lord Hope, para. 96; Lord Carswell, para. 166; Lady Hale 135-138. 
243. See para. 148-159. 
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illustrative comparative jurisprudence, or any real guidance as to the 
application of the balancing test in other factual contexts. Campbell 
is a decision which is firmly founded upon its own facts. Lower courts 
are still condemned to struggle with the incoherence produced by reli- 
ance upon the confidence action, and to try to glean some vague gui- 
dance from the uncertain indicators offered by the majority. Finally, 
it still appears to be too easy to demonstrate sufficient public inter- 
est, with the majority accepting that a legitimate public interest ex- 
isted in publicising that Ms Campbell was seeking treatment. The 
tentative smuggling of privacy rights via the back-door of the confi- 
dence action has resulted in a great judicial reluctance to require a 
strong public interest rationale for intrusive press stories. 
This stands in great contrast to the ground-breaking decision of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover v Ger- 
many244, which followed hot on the heels of Campbell and was the 
culmination of Princess Caroline of Monaco's decade-long campaign 
to assert her right to personal privacy. In this major decision, the 
Strasbourg court emphasised the crucial importance of privacy to in- 
dividual well-being, and emphatically acknowledged the very real ex- 
tent to which press intrusion can violate this essential value. 
The court proceeded to find that the German balancing test gave 
too much leeway to press intrusions upon the lives of public figures 
par excellence (i.e. persons permanently in the public eye, absolute 
Personen der Zeitgeschichte as described above) in permitting the 
publication of intrusive photos of the Princess and her partner going 
about their daily lives. For privacy intrusions to be justified, the court 
considered that they must be capable of contributing to a pressing 
matter of public debate or concern: the curiosity of the public was 
deemed to be an utterly inadequate justification. Von Hannover puts 
the final nail in the coffin of the approach initially taken by the Court 
of Appeal in A v B, with its equation of public curiosity with the pub- 
lic interest. In its scope and readiness to grasp the nettle of ensuring 
adequate protection for celebrity privacy interests, it also graphically 
demonstrates the timidity of the Campbell decision. The Strasbourg 
court found that the approach of the German courts was not suffi- 
cient to give those exposed to unjustified press intrusion a "legitimate 
expectation" that their privacy rights would be upheld: given the in- 
adequacy of the confidence remedy in comparison to the German 
case-law, it therefore appears inconceivable that the current English 
law meets the requirements of the Convention. Wainwright and 
Campbell, far from marking the completion of the development of a 
new remedy in English private law, seem now to be just staging posts 
on the route to the evolution of a fully fledged tort of privacy. 
244. Application no. 59320/00, judgment 24 June 2004. 
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